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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WESLEY A. MATHESON and
LOIS MATHESON,

]
;

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

]

vs.

])

MARBEC INVESTMENTS, LLC
d/b/a/ ELMWOOD APARTMENTS,
LLC,

;
;
;

Defendants/Appellees.

Case No. 20060543-CA

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
First, did the trial court commit error in granting the Defendants-Appellees9
motion for summary judgment and in so ruling, deciding as a matter of law, that there was
not a justiciable issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants had constructive
knowledge of the defect that proximately caused the Plaintiffs injuries. The issue was

preserved at the trial court level by Plaintiffs' extensive briefing and argument related to
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 186-221, Addendum, Exhibit "1")
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). See, e.g., Ingram v. Salt Lake City,
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248,
251 (Utah App.1988); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281,283 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, and grants summary judgment only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as
contended by the party opposing summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979). See also, e.g., Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Briggs, 740 P.2d at 283.
When the subject of an action is one that is based upon negligence, the appellate
courts of Utah have clearly stated that the test for granting summary judgment has to be
set exceptionally high. Therefore, the appellate courts review the district couifs decision
granting summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
determination, and review 'the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.' " J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales Kinglnt'l, Inc., 17

2

P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). "As we analyze the issues, we are mindful that,
'because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is
properly done by juries rather than judges, "summary judgment is appropriate in
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." ' " Trujillo v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 986
P.2d 752 (Utah 1999) (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996))
(other citation omitted); Sandberg v. Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C, 76 P.3d 699
(Utah App. 2003); Ingram, 733 P.2d at 126. See also, Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1985); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656
P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982).
Of particular concern to the courts, is the precept that "[o]rdinarily, whether a
defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury."
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). See also Ingram, 733 P.2d at 127;
Bowen, 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332,
1334-35 (Utah 1979); Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2,394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964).
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is
"fixed by law," Elmer v. Vanderford, 74 Wash.2d 546,445 P.2d 612, 614 (1968); see also
Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6,10 (Okla.1967), and
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under
the circumstances. See Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
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431 P.2d 126,129 (1967); English v. Kienke, 11A P.2d 1154,1156 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that since summary disposition
denies the losing party "the privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution
suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the questions of negligence . . . should be
resolved in favor of granting... a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563 P.2d 1245,
1246 (Utah 1977); See also, Anderson, 671 P.2d at 172; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587
P.2d 130,133 (Utah 1978).
Second, did the trial court commit error in failing to allow the Plaintiffs to employ
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply the required showing of actual or constructive
notice of the alleged defect in the stairs. Plaintiffs preserved the issue in their
presentation to the trial court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 257,
Addendum, Exhibit 1 at pp. 23-28)
In State v. Levin, 144 P.3d 1096 (Utah 2006), the appellate court considers three
factors to determine whether we should give some deference to a district court's
application of a specific legal doctrine to the facts: (1) the degree of variety and
complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a
trial court's application of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such
as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts;" and (3) other "policy
reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts." Id. (citation omitted).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The Appellants do not contend that there are any determinative constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules. However, the Appellants believe that the legal
standard established by Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App.
1988), is controlling and that as applied to the facts of this case, is dispositive in requiring
the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants, to recover for serious injury
and damage suffered as a result of a fall down a stairway at an apartment complex owned
and operated by the Defendants. Specifically, the Plaintiff, Wesley A. Matheson, was at
the Elmwood Apartments (located at 4320 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah), on
February 24,2001, in order to help his son and daughter-in-law move. (R. 1-5) While
trying to navigate a stairway on the premises, one of the stairs collapsed out from under
the Plaintiff, causing him to fall. Id. As a result, the Plaintiff suffered injury and damage
consisting of medical specials of over $60,000.00 and lost wages exceeding $30,000. The
Plaintiff, Lois Matheson, the wife of Wesley Matheson, suffered a loss of consortium due
to her husband's severe and ongoing injuries. Id.
At the conclusion of discovery on April 6,2006, the Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment with supporting memoranda. (R. 110-185) The Plaintiffs responded to
the motion (R. 186-221) and the Defendants submitted a reply memorandum. (R.
5

222-234).
The trial court set the matter for oral argument on May 8,2006 and, after the
matter was argued, took the Defendants' motion under advisement. (R. 235, the
Transcript of the May 8,2006 Hearing is attached as Exhibit "1" to the Addendum) On
May 17,2006, Judge Frederick entered a Minute Entry granting the Defendants' motion.
(R. 237-40). The Minute Entry was incorporated into an Order which was signed and
then entered in the record in this matter on May 31,2006. (R. 241-242, Addendum,
Exhibit "2") Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on June 7,2006. (R. 243-44)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

General Background of the Apartment Complex

The Elmwood Apartment complex, where the Plaintiff, Wesley Matheson, was
injured, is located at 4320 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. The complex,
comprised of thirty-six (36) units, was constructed in 1985. (R. 116). The Defendant
Marbec Investments, LLC purchased the complex on or about May 1, 2000 for a price in
excess of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00). (R. 117, Transcript of May 8,2006
Hearing, hereinafter referred to as "Tr." at 4)
B.

Defendants5 Constructive Notice of a Defect in the External
Stairs

There is no dispute that prior to Plaintiffs fall on February 4,2001, neither the
agents and representatives of the Defendants nor the Plaintiffs had any actual notice of
any problems or defects with the stairs in question. (R. 114, 116-118, 188) There is
6

likewise no question that the Plaintiffs and their son, who was residing at the complex at
the time of the fall, had used the stairway where the accident had occurred numerous
times and had detected no abnormality. Id.
However, as to the Defendants' constructive knowledge, the following facts are
central.
1.

Mr. Herbert Trayner, the principal representative of the Defendant
Marbec Investments, who inspected the complex prior to purchase
and participated in the management of Elmwood, has been a general
contractor in Utah since 1952, and thus had forty-four (44) years of
experience at the time of the Plaintiffs' injuries. (R. 188)

2.

During his work life as a general contractor, Mr. Trayner had built
residential homes, a copper mill, a leaching plant and five apartment
complexes. Each of the five apartment complexes constructed by
Mr. Trayner, had stairs. (R. 189)

3.

Mr. Trayner knew prior to the purchase of Elmwood that the
complex had been built in 1985 and that there had been no structural
changes made to the apartment complex, including the exterior stairs
where the Plaintiff fell, since Elmwood had been constructed in
1985. Id.

4.

Mr. Trayner knew that the stairs, where the Plaintiff fell, were
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exterior stairs, meaning that the stairs were located outside of a
structure and located in a non-heated area. Id. He knew that the
stairs where the Plaintiff fell were constructed of wood and that the
wood stairs had been wrapped in carpeting. Id.
5.

In his inspections of the Elmwood Apartment complex, Mr. Trayner
failed to verify whether or not the stair tread fit into the pocket on the
stair stringers and failed to inspect the general condition of the wood.
Id.

C.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Fall of the Plaintiff

Shawn and Angela Jo Matheson, the son and daughter-in-law of the Plaintiffs,
moved into Unit # 16 of the Elmwood Apartments in early 2000. Their unit was located
on the second floor of a three-story building, and it was accessed by a flight of stairs
running upfromthe ground-level sidewalk. (R. 117) Photographs of the stairway in
question and the failed step are attached as Exhibit "3" to the Addendum. (Addendum,
Exhibit "3," R. 170-75,258)
On February 24, 2001, the Plaintiffs, Wesley and Lois Matheson, went to Shawn
and Angela's apartment to help them move out. In aiding their son and daughter-in-law,
the Plaintiffs had traversed the stairs in question a number of times. (R. 118) Later in the
day, the Plaintiff, Wesley Matheson, Shawn, Shawn's father-in-law, Clay and a neighbor,
Doug, carried a couch out of the apartment and proceeded to carry it down the stairs.
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Clay and Doug went down the stairs first holding one end of the couch while the Plaintiff,
Wesley and Shawn carried the other endfromthe top of the stairs. (R. 119)
As the group proceeded down the stairway in question (Addendum, Exhibit "3"),
the fourth stair down gave way and the Plaintiff fell to the ground. (R. 119). As the
Plaintiff fell, his left leg hit the cement retaining wall very hard and he landed on his
back, slamming his head on the cement. As a result, the Plaintiff sustained serious and
permanent injuries and damage consisting of a concussion, bone bruise and multiple
injuries to other parts of his body. The same required medical treatment and
complications therefrom required hospitalization and a skin graft. The Plaintiff has
resulting permanent injury to multiple parts of his body. The medical specials are over
$60,000.00 and the Plaintiff has lost wages exceeding $30,000. The Plaintiff, Lois
Matheson, the wife of Wesley Matheson, suffered a loss of consortium due to her
husband's severe and ongoing injuries. (R. 1-5)
D.

Plaintiffs' Expert Testimony Regarding the Constructive
Knowledge of the Defendants of the Defect in the Stairs in
Question

The deposition testimony, expert report and affidavit of Dennis L. Brunetti was
made part of the Record in this matter. (R. 258,257 at pp. 16-17). Mr. Brunetti is a
property inspector, who does work for lenders, HUD, real estate companies and private
persons. He is a certified ICBO Building Inspector and has been so since 1979. He has
over twenty-five years of construction and construction management experience which
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included twelve years offieldexperience and thirteen years of construction management.
He has been involved and directly or indirectly responsible for the construction of
approximately 350 residential and light commercial properties. (Mr. Brunetti's curriculum
vitae, expert report and affidavit in this case are attached as Exhibit "4" to the Addendum)
1.

As controlling authority, Mr. Brunetti cited the Uniform Building
Code, 1985 Edition and the International Building Code 2003 edition
that requires all structures, both existing and new to be maintained in
a safe condition and requires owners to be "vigilant by performing
regular premise checks.. .. especially where tenants... walk to and
from the property.

2.

He cited Chapter 25 of the Unform Building Code, 1985 edition and
Section 2504(c), 4 to address the situation where a stair tread is fully
stressed for more than 10 years and found that "the way these stair
treads are cut into the stair stringers is not consistent with
adequate bearing of the tread on the stringer." (Emphasis added)

3.

Citing a myriad of Code sections, Mr. Brunetti stated that the
causative factors leading to the Plaintiffs fall included a lack of
vigilance on behalf of the owners in the maintenance of the wood
stairways. He cited the fact that some of the stair treads were not
bearing inside the pocket cut into the stair stringer. He noted that
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some wood treads had shrunk thus causing minimal or no bearing
inside and onto some of the stringers. Because of the shrinkage, the
only support for the treads were the nails that rusted over time.
From his examination of the stair in question, he stated that the stair
tread in question had split parallel to the grain and because of the
lack of any supplemental support, the tread and stair failed.
Mr. Brunetti stated that "[a] thorough inspection of all of the stairs at
the Elmwood Apartments . . . would have [revealed] the gaps where
the stair treads intersect the pockets on the stair stringers and a
[noticeable] cracking of an existing stir tread comingfromUnit #16
[that was] clearly visible
As it relates to this case, he stated in his affidavit, "that in
reviewing the information... it is my opinion that a thorough
inspection of the stairs at the Elmwood Apartments would have
put an inspector with Herbert Trayner's experience on notice
that there were gaps where the stair treads intersect with the
pockets on the stair stringers and that such an inspector would
have noticed cracking of an existing stair tread on the stairs
leading from Apartment 16

That given my understanding of

Mr. Herbert Trayner's experience as a general contractor a
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reasonable inspection performed by him would have alerted him
to the fact that the wood stairs on which Wesley Matheson was
injured, having been built some 20 years prior to the accident
and being wrapped with indoor outdoor carpeting and designed
the way they were designed, lacked sufficient integrity and the
condition of the stairs posed an unsafe condition for tenants and
other persons visiting Elmwood Apartments." (Emphasis added)
7.

Recognizing the need of an inspection given the age and condition of
the complex, Mr. Trayner stated that he personally inspected the
apartment complex on at least five different occasions and that he
looked at the various staircases at the property. (R. 115)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judge Frederick, in his Order granting the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, acknowledged that evidence of constructive notice of the defect in the stairs
would have been sufficient for the Plaintiffs to survive the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that this appeal can be resolved on that issue;
specifically, whether the Plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
Defendants had constructive notice of the defect in the stairs before the Plaintiffs fall.
As detailed in the Statement of Facts, the Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the
Defendants' principle representative, Mr. Trayner acknowledged given the age of the

12

building and other conditions of the acquisition, that an inspection was necessary which
inspection included the outdoor stairways. Plaintiffs submitted expert testimony that
indeed, an inspection was required and crucially, if an inspection had been done correctly,
the defects in the stairway in question would have been seen. Plaintiffs submit that this
evidence constitutes constructive knowledge that the Defendants and the trial court
acknowledged would have precluded summary judgment.
If for any reason this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not established the
required showing of "constructive notice," Plaintiffs submit that the trial court
committed error in failing to allow the Plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to establish the required actual or constructive notice of the alleged defects in the
stairs at the Elmwood apartment complex. The facts identified by the Plaintiffs, in
support of their showing of "constructive notice" establish the three prongs of resp ipsa.
Specifically, that steps normally do not normally fail absent negligence; the Defendants
maintained sole access to the aged and weather worn wood steps that were wrapped in
carpet; and that the Plaintiffs did not do anything unreasonable to cause their own
injuries. In that the trial court cannot weigh evidence or witness credibility at the
summary judgment level, there was no justification for the trial court to refuse to allow its
application.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

A.

PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
RELATING TO THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCTIVE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFECTS IN THE STAIRWAY TO
WARRANT DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The Standard for Granting Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). See, e.g., Ingram v. Salt Lake City,
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 751 P.2d 248,
251 (Utah App.1988); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281,283 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, and grants summary judgment only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as
contended by the party opposing summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979). See also, e.g., Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Briggs, 740 P.2d at 283.
When the subject of an action is one that is based upon negligence, the appellate
courts of Utah have clearly stated that the test for granting summary judgment has to be
set exceptionally high. Therefore, the appellate courts review the district court's decision
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granting summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
determination, and review 'the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.' " JR. Simplot Co. v. Sales Kinglnt'l, Inc., 17
P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). "As we analyze the issues, we are mindful that,
'because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is
properly done by juries rather than judges, "summary judgment is appropriate in
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." ' " Trujillo v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 986
P.2d 752 (Utah 1999) (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996))
(other citation omitted); Sandberg v. Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., 76 P.3d 699
(Utah App. 2003); Ingram, 733 P.2d at 126. See also, Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1985); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656
P.2d 434,436 (Utah 1982).
Of particular concern to the courts, is the precept that "[ojrdinarily, whether a
defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury."
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). See also Ingram, 733 P.2d at 127;
Bowen, 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332,
1334-35 (Utah 1979); Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964).
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is
"fixed by law," Elmer v. Vanderford, 74 Wash.2d 546, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (1968); see also
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Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6, 10 (Okla.1967), and
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under
the circumstances. See Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
431 P.2d 126,129 (1967); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154,1156 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that since summary disposition
denies the losing party "the privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution
suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the questions of negligence... should be
resolved in favor of granting

a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Int% 563 P.2d 1245,

1246 (Utah 1977); See also, Anderson, 671 P.2d at 172; Rees v. Albertson% Inc., 587
P.2d 130,133 (Utah 1978).
B.

Plaintiffs Submitted Sufficient Evidence to Withstand
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

A review of the trial court's Order granting summary judgment reveals that there
was considerable dispute between the parties as to whether the defect in the stairway was
a permanent unsafe condition, for which no notice on the part of the Defendants was
required for liability; or, that the defect in the stairway was a temporary unsafe condition,
requiring actual or constructive notice of the defect to affect liability. (R. 237-40,
Addendum, Exhibit "2") Judge Frederick explicitly conditioned the granting of summary
judgment on his finding that there were no justiciable issues of fact that demonstrated that
the Defendants had actual or constructive notice of the defect.
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While at first blush, this appears to be a "permanent" unsafe condition case.
Goebel makes clear that matters such as this (where Defendant did not
create the unsafe condition and is responsible for it only in the context of
maintenance, not for its existence in the first place) are to be treated as
"temporary" unsafe conditions. Indeed, similar to the Goebel case, the
proximate cause of Mr. Matheson's injuries is the breakdown or
degradation of something (the stairs) that was not alleged to have been
negligently created or installed. This said, the undisputed evidence
clearly establishes that Defendant had no notice of the problem with
the stairs, actual or constructive. Consequently, summary judgment,
as requested, is appropriate and granted. (Emphasis added)
Addendum, Exhibit "2"
Without waiving the arguments advanced hereafter, Plaintiffs submit that this
appeal can be disposed of, using the standard applied by Judge Frederick. Plaintiff
submits that it submitted sufficient evidence of constructive notice on the part of the
Defendants to meet the legal standard.
In Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App.,1988), the
tenant's invitee sued the landlord for personal injuries and property damage he sustained
when the roof of storage shed collapsed as alleged result of weight of snow and ice
which had been allowed to accumulate upon it. In disposing of the issue, the Court
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established the general duty of the landlord:
To impose a common law duty on a property owner for one who has been
injured on his property, the injured person would have to be classified as an
invitee, a licensee or a trespasser. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438,441 (Utah
1979); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 329-343 (1965). However, the
landlord's common law duty has been expanded in almost every
jurisdiction, including Utah. Williams, 699 P.2d at 726. The Utah Supreme
Court no longer limits a landlord's liability by the artificial common law
categories, but now imposes upon landlords "a duty to exercise
reasonable care toward their tenants in all circumstances." Id.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 91.
The Court, then proclaimed that while the landlord is not an insurer of the safety
of his tenants, liability can be attached if the plaintiff demonstrates that defendant
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed and that sufficient time had elapsed to take corrective action.
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). The Court in
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah App.,1993), restated the exact
same principles and noted:
When a plaintiffs claim is based on the ownerfs failure to repair rather
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than on affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing
the owner knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known,
a dangerous condition existed and the owner had sufficient time to take
corrective action. Id. The appellant need not prove his or her case
before the case may be submitted to the jury. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,47 (Utah App.1988). The appellant
need only submit evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. Id.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 1028.
Utah has a clear legal standard as to the extent of expert testimony required to
defeat a directed verdict or summary judgment. In Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that an expert witness can defeat summary
judgment by expressing conclusions as to the dispositive issues before the finder of fact
and by identifying the specific grounds upon which his or her conclusions are based. Id. at
104. Only when the expert states a conclusion without identifying supporting facts will
summary judgment be appropriate. See also, Nay v. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck
Div., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah, 1993).
This doctrine that relates to experts fits hand in hand with the general notion that
trial courts are not to weigh evidence in determining a party's right to summary judgment.
The case law is clear that summary judgment cannot be granted based on the credibility
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and weight of the parties1 respective evidence. See Lamb v.B&B Amusements Corp., 869
P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (stating that the evidence presented on summary judgment
"may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact exists, not to determine
whether one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed in a
trial on the merits") On the contrary, "[t]rial courts must avoid weighing evidence and
assessing credibility when ruling on motions for summary judgment/' Trujillo v. Utah
Dep't ofTransp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999). As noted above, to oppose a motion
for summary judgment a party "is required only to show that there is a material issue of
fact," and not to show that "one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not
likely to succeed in a trial on the merits." Lamb, 869 P.2d at 928.
Having now identified the legal standard applicable to the facts and the quantum of
evidence required, it is important to establish a clear meaning of "constructive notice." In
Utah two types of constructive notice that are generally recognized. One kind of
constructive notice is notice which results from a record or which is imputed by the
recording statutes; and the other is notice which is presumed because of the fact that a
person has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to,
knowledge of the ultimate fact First American Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966
P.2d 834 (Utah,1998); 66 C.J.S. Notice § 6 (1950) (footnotes omitted). Thefirsttype is
evidenced in the Utah Recording Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000 as
Amended), which provides that documents and instruments filed with the county recorder
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pursuant to this statute "impart notice to all persons of their contents." Utah's case law
has long recognized the second type of constructive notice-inquiry notice. See County Bd.
ofEqualization v. State Tax Comm% 789 P.2d 291, 294 (Utah 1990) (stating in dictum
that purchaser had inquiry notice of unassessed property taxes); Meyer v. General
American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094,1097 (Utah 1977) (stating that "[constructive notice can
occur when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to
require further inquiry on his part"); Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Courtesy Motors, 8 Utah
2d 275,277-78, 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959) (holding that the buyer was on inquiry notice
that title to motor vehicle was defective); Salt Lake, Garfield & W. Ry. v. Allied Materials
Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 883 (1955) (explaining and applying the doctrine of inquiry
notice). As stated above, inquiry notice "occur[s] when circumstances arise that should
put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part." Meyer, 569
P.2d at 1097. In Allied Materials, the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule of inquiry
notice as follows:
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall
be deemed conversant of it. 291 P.2d at 885 (quoting O'Reilly v. McLean,
84 Utah 551, 564,37 P.2d 770,775 (1934) (other citations omitted)).
Id.
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Plaintiffs submit that the evidence presented to the trial court to establish
constructive notice of the defective condition of the stairs was sufficient. Mr. Herbert
Trayner, the principal representative of the Defendant Marbec Investments, who
inspected the complex prior to purchase and participated in the management of Elmwood,
had been a general contractor in Utah since 1952, and thus had forty-four (44) years of
experience at the time of the Plaintiffs' fall. (R. 188) By virtue of his licensing as a
general contractor, he had knowledge of and access to the controlling building codes. Mr.
Trayner had built residential homes, a copper mill, a leaching plant and five apartment
complexes. Each of the five apartment complexes constructed by Mr. Trayner, had stairs.
(R. 189) Mr. Trayner knew prior to the purchase of Elmwood that the complex had been
built in 1985 and that there had been no structural changes made to the apartment
complex, including the exterior stairs where the Plaintiff fell, since Elmwood9 s
construction. Id. Mr. Trayner knew that the stairs, where the Plaintiff fell, were exterior
stairs, meaning that the stairs were located outside of a structure and located in a
non-heated area. Id. He knew that the stairs where the Plaintiff fell were constructed of
wood and that the wood stairs had been wrapped in carpeting. Id. In his inspections of the
Elmwood Apartment complex, Mr. Trayner failed to verify whether or not the stair tread
fit into the pock on the stair stringers and failed to inspect the general condition of the
wood.
Id.
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Most compelling is the fact that the Defendants' representative, Mr. Trayner,
knew that based upon the age of the complex, the construction of the stairs and the
other factors cited above, an inspection of the stairs was necessary. Therefore, there
can be no dispute that "reasonableness" under the circumstances of this case
entailed an inspection of the stairways and stairs. Mr. Trayner inspected the complex
five times before the purchase was completed and Mr. Trayner acknowledged the need
to inspect the staircase and stairs. In fact, Mr. Trayner stated that he inspected the
stairs and stair cases and even went so far as jumping on various stairs. (R. 115)
The Plaintiffs' expert, Dennis L. Brunetti, by way of deposition and affidavit
testified based upon his examination of the actual collapsed stair, afieldexamination at
the complex of the stairways and stairs, a review of the applicable industry standards and
the facts relating to the Plaintiffs fall. (R. 258, Addendum, Exhibit "4") He testified that
special care had to be taken by a landlord in the areas where tenants walk and that special
care included regular inspections. He testified as to the special problem created by wood
that is used in the elements for more than 10 years and the importance of checking the
alignment of the stair tread into the stair stringers. He testified that a reasonable
inspection revealed that the treads at the complex violated the requirements. He cited the
fact that some of the stair treads were not bearing inside the pocket cut into the stair
stringer. He noted that some wood treads had shrunk thus causing minimal or no bearing
inside and onto some of the stringers. Because of the shrinkage, the only support for the
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treads were the nails that rusted over time.
Importantly, Mr. Brunetti stated that a reasonable inspection of all of the
stairs at the Elmwood Apartments would have revealed the gaps where the stair
treads intersect the pockets on the stair stringers and a noticeable cracking of an
existing stir tread coming from Unit #16 that was clearly visible. In his affidavit, he
stated "that in reviewing the information... it is my opinion that a thorough
inspection of the stairs at the Elmwood Apartments would have put an inspector
with Herbert Trayner's experience on notice that there were gaps where the stair
treads intersect with the pockets on the stair stringers and that such an inspector
would have noticed cracking of an existing stair tread on the stairs leading from
Apartment... .That given my understanding of Mr. Herbert Trayner's experience
as a general contractor a reasonable inspection performed by him would have
alerted him to the fact that the wood stairs on which Wesley Matheson was injured,
having been built some 20 years prior to the accident and being wrapped with
indoor outdoor carpeting and designed the way they were designed, lacked sufficient
integrity and the condition of the stairs posed an unsafe condition for tenants and
other persons visiting Elmwood Apartments." (Emphasis added) (R. 258, addendum
Exhibit "4")
The question is therefore, did the Defendants, acting through Mr. Trayner, have
constructive notice (notice which is presumed because of the fact that a person has
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knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the
ultimate fact) of the defective condition? The Plaintiffs need only prove that the owner
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, a dangerous condition
existed. Gregory v. FourthwestInvestments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App.1988).
Plaintiffs' expert testimony, based on facts and clearly established industry standards, has
carried that burden by concluding that a reasonable inspection would have revealed the
defects. Other facts cited above, detailing the age of the complex, the composition of the
stairs and other factors cited carry the burden of establishing that Mr. Trayner knew
everything he needed to know to lead him to the ultimate fact that the stairs were
defective.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the evidence, without the expert, was
sufficient to carry the burden in this case by establishing an agreement that an inspection
of the stairs was necessary and that Mr. Trayner attempted to do numerous inspections
and missed what was there to be seen. Secondly, as required by the Utah Supreme Court,
Plaintiffs' expert has submitted sufficient conclusions and a more than adequate
foundation to defeat summary judgment based alone on his affidavit and report.
Plaintiffs submit that using the standard of constructive notice urged by the
Defendants and accepted by Judge Frederick, the Plaintiffs have met their burden of
proving the existence of justiciable issues of fact.
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POINT II: CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT
PLAINTIFFS' USE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO
AVOID THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A review of the case lawfromother jurisdictions confirms that the Defendants had
the requisite constructive notice of the defect in the carpet-wrapped, aged wood stairs to
warrant reversal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in this
matter. In Solomon v. Loszynski, 21 A.D.3d 366, 800 N.Y.S.2d 46 (N.Y.A.D. 2
Dept.,2005), the appellate court reversed the trial court grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and reinstated the plaintiffs complaint. The plaintiff had brought
a premises liability action against the property owners to recover for injuries sustained
when staircase collapsed. The court stated that,
In premises liability cases alleging an injury caused by a defective
condition, the plaintiff must show that the landowner either created the
defective condition, or had actual or constructive notice thereof for such a
period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have
corrected it (see McKeon v. Town of Oyster Bay, 292 A.D.2d 574, 739
N.Y.S.2d 739; Austin v. Lambert, 275 A.D.2d 333, 334, 712 N.Y.S.2d 153).
On their motion for summary judgment, the defendants Joseph Loszynski
and Deborah Loszynski established their prima facie entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320,
508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572). However, contrary to the Supreme
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Court's determination, in opposition, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact
as to whether the staircase was in a dangerous or defective condition and
whether the Loszynskis had actual or constructive notice thereof prior to its
collapse {see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., supra; see Zuckerman v. City of
New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557,427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718).
The point that an owner of a premises has a duty to inspect important structures
over time was also a key in the court's decision in Kamp v. Preis, 332 IU.App.3d 1115,
266 Ill.Dec. 426 Ill.App. 5 Dist.,2002. Michael Meehan was a student and rented an
apartment from William J. Preis. The apartment was owned by Preis and his wife through
Preis Home Construction, Inc. The apartment building was a quadplex—a building
containing four residential units. Preisfs construction company was responsible for
building the particular quadplex occupied by Michael Meehan. However, based upon
the court's ruling on the statute of limitations, the appellate court reviewed only
Preis's liability based upon his status as the landlord. Id.
Michael Meehanfs apartment was one of two upstairs apartments. The two upstairs
apartments share a deck that is 20 feet long and 10 feet wide and separated in the middle
by a wooden divider. The ledger boards were attached to the buildings at the joists by 30
pole-bam nails. The nails utilized in the deck constructed at Michael Meehanfs apartment
were ungalvanized. Ungalvanized nails can rust. On May 15,1998, Audra Kamp attended
a party hosted by Michael Meehan at his apartment. The partygoers were also on the deck.
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About 11 p.m., Kamp and an estimated 35 to 40 other people were standing on this deck,
when the deck suddenly collapsed. Kamp and the others fell 15 feet to the ground below.
Kamp's right leg was severely injured in the accident. Her leg was three-fifths severed,
with afracturedtibia andfibula.Id. at 1130.
The plaintiff alleged negligent construction, negligent maintenance, and failure to
warn of the maximum number of people who should be allowed on the deck. The trial
court determined that the statute of limitations barred the suit against Preis Home
Construction, Inc., for negligent construction but that the corporation maintained a
possessory interest in the property and could be sued as a landlord. Id.
Following deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for Kamp in the total amount of
$1,300,319. On appeal, one of the central issues revolved around the landlord's duty with
regard to the deck. The plaintiff, Kamp alleged that the defendant was negligent in one
or more of the following respects:
A. Permitt[ed] the deck to become in such a disrepaired condition as to be
unsafe for use;
B. Allowed the deck to be used when there were insufficient supports to
hold the deck in place and upright;
C. Allowed the deck to be used when it was not properly attached to the
structure;
D. Failed to forewarn his tenants of the maximum number of individuals
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allowed on said deck.
The appellate court held that the allegations involved the notice that Preis had, as
landlord, relative to the safety of the deck at issue. The following paragraph of Kamp's
complaint explains her theory:" [T]he above[-]referenced latent conditions were, or in the
exercise of reasonable care would have been and should have been[,] known to * * * [the
defendant]"Id. Based thereon, the appellate court found no error in the evidence that was
presented regarding the construction of the deck, the need for inspection and care and
affirmed the jury's verdict. Id.
Similar interpretations of constructive knowledge have been used by other courts.
Constructive notice has been defined as " 'information or knowledge of a fact imputed by
law to a person (although he may not actually have it), because he could have discovered
the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of
inquiring into it.1 "Kirby v. Macon Co., 892 S.W.2d 403,409 (Tenn.1994). "[i]f there are
circumstances sufficient to put a party upon the inquiry, he is held to have notice of
everything which that inquiry, properly conducted would certainly disclose; but
constructive notice goes no further." McGee v. French, 49 S.C. 454, 27 S.E. 487 (1897)
(holding where facts were sufficient to be put on inquiry, then it was equivalent to
notice); Huestess v. South Atl Life Ins. Co., 88 S.C. 31, 39, 70 S.E. 403,406 (1911)
(finding inquiry equivalent to actual notice); Norris v. Greenville, & & A. Ry., 111 S.C.
322, 330, 97 S.E. 848, 850 (1919) (holding if notice sufficient to be put on inquiry, then
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knowledge is presumed); City of Greenville v. Washington Am. League Baseball Club,
205 S.C. 495, 509, 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945) (inquiry is notice); Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Chavis, 254 S.C. 507, 176 S.E.2d 131 (1970) (Brailsford, J., dissenting)
(knowledge sufficient to put on inquiry is equivalent to actual notice); Multimedia Pub. of
S.C, Inc. v. Mullins, 314 S.C. 551,431 S.E.2d 569 (1993) (if notice sufficient to be put
on inquiry, then knowledge is presumed); Fuller-Ahrens Partnership v. South Carolina
Dep't ofHighways & Pub. Transp., 311 S.C. 177, 185,427 S.E.2d 920, 924
(Ct.App.1993), cert, denied, (October 7,1993) (Cureton, J., concurring and dissenting)
("Actual notice may be inferred from circumstances. That which puts a party on inquiry
is the equivalent of actual notice.") (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471,29 S.E.2d
419,424(App.l944)).
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that, under the standard adopted by the Utah courts
and that used by courts considering cases involving structures similar to the steps in this
case, the Defendants had constructive knowledge of the defect and failed to act
reasonably to eliminate the same.
POINT III: PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO USE THE
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO IMPUTE
LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANTS UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
In addition, the Plaintiffs submit that this is an appropriate case to incorporate the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the negligence of the Defendants.
Res ipsa loquitur "is not a theory of liability; rather, it is an evidentiary rule that
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governs the adequacy of evidence in some negligence cases. "Myrlak v. PortAuth. ofN. Y.
andNJ., 157 NJ. 84, 95, 723 A.2d 45 (1999). The doctrine "is a method of
circumstantially proving the existence of negligence." Id. It permits an inference of
negligence without direct evidence where three elements are established: (1) the event
does not normally happen in the absence of negligence, (2) the instrument of harm was
exclusively within the defendant's control, and (3) there is no indication that the plaintiff
caused her own injury. Id. Where applicable, res ipsa allows a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case and to withstand a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, for lack
of direct proof of negligence. Id. The integration of the doctrine relieves the plaintiff
from establishing actual or constructive notice to the landlord who did not, by affirmative
act, create the dangerous condition. If the three elements of the doctrine are established, a
prima facie case of negligence is proven. As demonstrated below, all of the factors are
present in a case involving an external staircase made of wood that is wrapped in carpet.
The landlord clearly has the duty to maintain outside structures and would be the only one
who would have the right to remove the carpet to perform the inspection and repair.
Therefore the facts, as submitted by the parties present justicable issues of material fact
relating to res ipsa, which if established, prove the Defendants' negligence.
In Torres v. Cordice, 11 Misc.3d 23, — N.Y.S.2d — , 2006 WL176941
(N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2006), the injured plaintiff was a meter reader for Consolidated
Edison who fell while descending a wooden staircase leading to the basement of

31

residential premises owned by defendant. Plaintiffs testimony tended to indicate that a
recurring leak in the area had rotted the steps and handrail, causing them to collapse.
Defendant offered no evidence at trial with respect to liability.
This case turned on the denial, by the trial court, of the plaintiff request for a jury
charge on res ipsa loquitur on the ground that the doctrine is inapplicable where "the
plaintiffs witnesses gave a complete explanation of why this accident happened." The
appellate court held that a plaintiff who elicits proof of specific acts of negligence can
also seek to use the inference of res ipsa loquitur, unless the two alternate modes of proof
are fundamentally or inherently inconsistent (see Abbott v. Page Airways, 23 N.Y.2d 502,
511-514,297 N.Y.S.2d 713,245 N.E.2d 388 [1969]). The court found, on appeal, that
the evidence of specific acts of negligence did not contradict or overcome the inference of
res ipsa (cf. Duncan v. Corbetta, 178 A.D.2d 459, 577 N.Y.S.2d 129 [1991]). Moreover,
the court held, that even though some of the circumstances of the accident are undisputed,
the actual and specific causes of the collapse were not firmly established (see Bonura v.
KWK Assoc., 2 A.D.3d 207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 5 [2003] ).
The appellate court held that to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
plaintiff must establish that the accident was not of a kind ordinarily occurring in the
absence of negligence, that the instrumentality or agency causing the accident was within
the defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was not due to any voluntary
action or contribution by the plaintiff (Kambat v. St Francis Hosp., 89 N.Y.2d 489, 494,
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655 N.Y.S.2d 844, 678 N.E.2d 456 [1997]).
Thefirstand third elements of plaintiffs' res ipsa claim were clearly
established and, indeed, are not now challenged on appeal. Stairs and
protective hand railings do not generally collapse and fall apart in the
absence of negligence, i.e., due to faulty installation, maintenance or
repair, and the mere act of walking down stairs while holding onto the
railing does not make the accident plaintiffs fault or put the stairs and
railing under his control (Brisbon v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 8 Misc.3d 47, 48,
798 N.Y.S.2d 648 [2005], citing Pavon v. Rudin, 254 A.D.2d 143,145, 679
N.Y.S.2d 27 [1998]). With respect to the element of exclusive control,
trial testimony that this basement staircase was "infrequently" used by
a single tenant was of "sufficient exclusivity to fairly rule out the
chance that the defect... was caused by some agency other than
defendant's negligence" (Dermatossian v. New York City Tr. Auth., 67
N.Y.2d 219,228, 501 N.Y.S.2d 784,492 N.E.2d 1200 [1986])....
Id.
In Katz v. Goldring, 237 A.D. 824, 260 N.Y.S. 796 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept, Dec 02,
1932), the plaintiff, who was a plumber's helper, was assisting his employer in replacing
washtubs in defendant's tenement house with sinks. While he and his employer were
carrying out one of washtubs from an upper apartment, the plaintiff was injured when
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landing of stairway on which they momentarily rested with such washtub collapsed,
allowing washtub and plaintiff to fall through the opening to thefloorbelow. The trial
court charged the jury, in part, as follows:
The premises involved in this case are admittedly a tenement house,
and the duty devolved upon the defendant, who is the owner, to keep
the stairway and its landings in good repair, and not to permit it to be
in unsafe and dangerous condition at any time prior to the accident,
and the defendant is not liable unless you find from all the evidence
in this case that the defendant had notice or knowledge of the
existence of the unsafe and dangerous condition; in other words,
gentlemen, the mere existence of a negligent condition without
notice of its existence, either as a matter of personal knowledge or
for the reason that it obtained for such a period of time that in the
exercise of ordinary care the landlord could or should have known of
its existence, does not create a liability. The negligent condition must
exist and the landlord must have actual notice of its existence or
constructive notice; that is, that the situation existed for such a
period of time that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant
could have known or should have known of its existence and
remedied itf
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The trial court refused the request of plaintiff s counsel to charge that, if the jury 'finds
and believes that this accident happened because the landing on which the plaintiff
was walking down fell, with the plaintiff on it and that no act of negligence on his
part contributed thereto, and that there is no satisfactory explanation of the cause of
the falling by the defendant, then and in that event the plaintiff may recover/ Id.
The appellate court reversed holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies, that actual or constructive notice need not be proved because the defect was
apparently structural in its nature. Id.
In McConaughead v. Horaitis, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 121656 (Ohio App. 5
Dist.,2005), the plaintiff was descending an interior staircase in his daughter's home,
when the staircase ruptured beneath him, causing him to fall into the staircase. As a result
of the fall, McConaughead suffered severe injuries to his groin, right leg, right knee, back
and his right testicle was amputated. At the time of the accident, the stairs were covered
with carpet. McConaugheadfs daughter leased the premises from appellee, Nick Horaitis.
In this case, there was testimony that the plaintiff and his daughter had notice of some
irregularity with regard to the interior steps but that notice and the subsequent
communication of the irregularity to the defendant, did not affect the court's ruling on res
ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur creates an inference of negligence upon
proof appellee had exclusive control of the instrument causing injury and
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the accident was one that would not ordinarily happen in the absence of
negligence. Waite v. Thomas Emery's Sons (Hamilton 1940), 32 N.E.2d
764, 32 Ohio Law Abs. 521 (where plaintiff fell through a loose board in an
attic used by joint tenants). "To warrant application of the rule a plaintiff
must adduce evidence in support of two conclusions: (1) That the
instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury, or at the
time of the creation of the condition causing the injury, under the exclusive
management and control of the defendant; and (2) that the injury occurred
under such circumstances that in the ordinary course of events it would not
have occurred if ordinary care had been observed." Glowacki v. North
Western Ohio Ry. & Power Co. (1927), 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21; Fink
v. New York Central Rd. Co., supra; Renneckar v. Canton Terminal
Restaurant (1947), 148 Ohio St. 119, 73 N.E.2d 498; Soltz v. Colony
Recreation Center, supra; Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1954), 160
Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7; Schafer v. Wells (1961), 171 Ohio St. 506, 172
N.E.2d 708. (Emphasis added). Whether sufficient evidence has been
adduced at trial to warrant application of the rule is a question of law to be
determined initially by the trial court, subject to review upon appeal. See,
Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 65, 262
N.E.2d 703. Appellants argue appellee did in fact have exclusive control
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over the staircase; therefore, the res ipsa doctrine applies. We agree. A
tenant's possession of the premises is not equivalent to control; nor does
possession negate a landlord's "exclusive" management and control
Further, the alleged defect sub judice was covered by carpeting on the
stairs. To inspect the alleged defect would have required removal of the
carpeting by the tenant. We find the authority to remove the carpet and
make any necessary repairs discovered rests with the landlord, and would
require approval of the landlord. Based upon the foregoing, we find
appellee landlord maintained exclusive maintenance and control over the
alleged defect, despite the tenant's possession of the premises
Id.
In this case, all three of the elements of the doctrine apply. Stairways and stairs do
not normally collapse unless there is negligence. Although the tenants used the stairs
frequently, the aged and weather worn wood steps that were wrapped in carpet were the
exclusive province of the landlord and certainly, the Plaintiffs did nothing unreasonable
that led to their injuries. Accordingly, this is an appropriate case to adopt the doctrine
that plaintiffs, in this and similar defective condition actions has the right to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa, if a prima facie case for the same can be made, to overcome the
requirement of actual or constructive notice on the part of the owner or landlord of a
defect.
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Because the trial court does not have a right to weigh evidence or judge credibility
at the summary judgment level, the Court should give no deference to the trial court's
decision to refuse to allow the Plaintiffs to apply the doctrine. In fact, although the issue
was argued to Judge Frederick, he failed to even mention the same in his ruling and order
and therefore, this Court has no ruling by judge Frederick on the issue with which to
contend.
The application of the doctrine, based upon the facts presented in this matter,
would warrant reversal of the grant of summary judgment in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based either upon the submission of clear evidence relating to the Defendants'
knowledge of the defect in the stairs or the opinions of Plaintiffs' expert, that were based
upon an extensive investigation and application of industry standards, this Court should
reverse the grant of summary judgment and rule that either the evidence relating to the
knowledge of the Defendants or the opinions and findings of the Plaintiffs' expert,
established significant material issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
Alternatively, the Court should determine that the trial court erred in failing to allow the
Plaintiffs to employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to meet the burden of demonstrating
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actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the Defendants of the alleged defects,
which also would preclude summary judgment.
Dated this ji_ day of December, 2006.
IVIE& YOUNG

R. Phil Iviel, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 8, 2006)

3

THE COURT:

We are convened in the matter of Matheson

4

vs. Marbec, case No. 051427.

5

you would state your appearances for the record, please.

I would appreciate it, Counsel, if

6

MR. IVIE:

Phil Ivie for the plaintiff, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Very well.

8

MR. PLANT:

Terry Plant for the defendant.

9

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Let me

10

indicate I have reviewed the memoranda, both in support of the

11

motion for summary judgment and the memorandum in opposition.

12

You may proceed at this time, if you would, Mr. Plant.

13

MR. PLANT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I

14

appreciate the fact and know you very well in terms of your

15

preparation.

16

that you know, but I want to emphasize the things that I think

17

are important for the Court's consideration of our motion.

18

I appreciate that.

I don't mean to go over stuff

Just very briefly to review, this is an accident that

19

occurred back on February 24th of 2001 when a gentlemen was

20

helping his son -- the gentlemen being the plaintiff was helping

21

his son move, and they were carrying a couch down some stairs

22

that were at the Elmwood Apartments.

23

suddenly and without any notice whatsoever the stair gave way.

24
25

For some reason, and very

It's interesting in that they had been moving stuff down
before this, there was a group of two men on the front of the
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couch that had walked over the same step right before the two

2

gentlemen that were in the back, and for some reason at that

3

moment the stair gave way.

4

easy.

That fact is pretty simple and pretty

I don't think anyone has any problem with that.

5

Other facts that I think are undisputed are the fact

6

that no one had any notice of any problem with this stair. No

7

one. We went and we deposed the plaintiff who had been to this

8

facility several times.

9

children, the kids of plaintiff that lived there —

He had no problems.

We deposed the
who had lived

10

there for 14 months prior to this accident, by their estimation

11

had used this step between 1,000 to 1600 times.

12

indication whatsoever that there was an issue of any kind with

13

this stair.

14

about wobbling, it was creaking, any movement, any indication or

15

problem.

16

None.

Zero.

I was very thorough in asking them

There was none.
My guy, a guy by the name of Herb Treanor who is the

17

principal of what is now the Elmwood Apartments.

18

Marbec.

19

Same entity.

20

important.

21

about a year or so before the accident occurred.

22

They had no

It used to be

They changed the name simply because it was confusing.
He went out an purchased this, and this is

He became interested in buying the Elmwood Apartments

The actual sale was consummated on May 1st of 2000, which

23

is about nine months before this accident occurred, something

24

like that. Was the owner only for that short period of time.

25

The Elmwoods were built in 1985. By all accounts, particularly

-41 I the plaintiff's children, it was very well taken care of.

They

2

had no complaints whatsoever regarding the maintenance or the

3

condition of the property.

4

was an issue —

5

there —

6

Everything was well done.

If there

and there were really none during their tenure

that were taken care of immediately.
My guy, Herb Treanor in anticipation of buying the

7 I facility, as the Court knows as you've read, went out and
8

inspected this facility himself.

9

at the apartments, jumped on some of the stairs and was certain

10
11

By that he went around, looked

himself that the facility was in good shape.
However, as you might appreciate and as you know, this

12

was a situation where there was a loan taken out for $2,000,000.

13

I don't think you know that, but I'll tell you that —

14

to buy this property.

15

people interested in the integrity of this place than just him.

16

The financial people, all of those folks who have an interest in

17

knowing what kind of a property that they're getting involved in.

18

$2,000,000

As a result of that, there were more

He therefore'retains an MIA appraiser by the name of

19

Jeff Neves.

20

lot about this, but MIA means Master Appraiser's Institute, and

21

it's the highest level of appraisers that one gets.

22

indicated that he was told and he believed in the report that

23

Mr. Neves indicated —

24

whatsoever with the structure of the facility.

25

I'm told, your Honor —

I don't really know a whole

Mr. Treanor

suggested that there were no problems

All this goes to every —

him doing whatever due

~5~
1

diligence was required of him as a purchaser.

He reviewed it

2

himself.

3

facility.

4

problem with any stairway, but particularly this one.

5

the record is abundantly clear, and I don't think it's going to

6

be contested that there was no actual notice of any problem

7

associated with this stair or any stairs.

He hired a qualified inspector to go out and review the
All of that yielded no evidence whatsoever of any
So I think

8

So we're left in the situation of the plaintiff walking

9

down the stairs, presumably non-negligent himself, and the stair

10

giving way without notice and falling down and injuring himself.

11

Those facts are conceded at this point.

12 I

So we look to the law.

The law is very interesting and

13

very helpful in this regard to the Court.

14

hope the Court —

15

chance to take a look at the case of Goble vs. Southern Pacific

16

Railroad —

17

moment and go through some of the portions of that case with the

18

Court, because I think that is the most helpful thing I can do to

19

assist you.

20
21

and I need to know if the Court did have a

Southern Railroad.

THE COURT:
that to make it

We've attached, and I

If you —

If not, I would like to take a

yes, you may distribute a copy of

—

22

MR. PLANT:

Okay.

Let me have it marked.

23

THE COURT:

-- more readily available (inaudible).

24

MR. PLANT:

(Inaudible) want to

25

THE COURT:

That seems to be the pivotal case that both

—
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(inaudible).

2

MR. PLANT:

I'll (inaudible).

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4

MR. PLANT:

That's the Westlaw version of the case.

5

Very simply stated, your Honor,, this case involved a case that

6

involved a railroad crossing over here not too far on 7th West and

7

14th South, or something like that.

8

there was a protuberance —

9

this railroad crossing, and somehow as the plaintiff in that

The claim was claimed that

that's the word —

that existed on

10

case was driving his bicycle over this railroad crossing, his

11

this protuberance got in the way and caused the bicycle tire to

12

go into a gap that existed in the railroad crossing and allegedly

13

caused this guy to crash.

14

The Court took the opportunity to review the obligation

15

of the land owner, the obligation of someone that was in

16

possession of the property, and the first thing that they did

17

and I think this is important —

18

scheme to determine whether or not Southern Railroad had an

19

obligation to maintain and be responsible for this railroad

20

crossing.

21

—

—

they went through the statutory

That was through the entire —

you know, the statute.

If you look on page 3 of the decision, that is primarily

22

the Court's —

especially the second column —

Court's

23

explanation of why it is that Southern had a duty for this

24

railroad crossing.

25

going to argue that we had responsibility for this building.

That's important because the plaintiffs are
We
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don't deny that.

2

case will tell you that our responsibility under the

3

circumstances was maintenance.

4

We had some responsibility, but I think this

The Court goes on in this Goble case to talk about the

5

duty of care, so to speak, of the landowner or someone who had

6

possession of premises, and they go back to this old Schoonerpase

7

(phonetic) vs. Storehouse Market case, which is an ^86 case which

8

involves some ice cream on the floor.

9

and establish the difference between cases —

They talk about and try
or excuse me,

10

defects and property that were temporary and permanent, and they

11

talk about notice.

12

One of the things they talk about and make very clear,

13

and I think the Court is already aware of this, but there is no

14

such thing as strict liability when it comes to this sort of an

15

issue.

16

liability as a means of holding a landowner responsible.

17

There needs to be negligence.

They remove strict

So they talk about some things, your Honor, and they

18

talk about first off, if you go with me to page 5'of that

19

opinion, they quote a case by the name of Allen, and they talk

20

about the duty of care that you have under certain circumstances.

21

It used to be under Allen they'd say if you look under that quote

22

about, oh, a fourth of the way up it says, "Involve the second

23

classes of cases, which are permanent defects involve" —

24

the reading it says, "Involve some unsafe condition of a

25

permanent nature such as," and then it talks about a stairway.

and in

1

At the bottom of that quote it says, "In such circumstances where

2

the defendant either created a condition or is responsible for

3

it, is deemed to know the condition and for no further proof of

4

notice is necessary."

5 I

Plaintiffs in their response talk about that responsible

6

for it, but as you read on, you'll realize what the Court is

7

saying, responsible for the defect, not responsible for the

8

condition.

9

then notice needs to be established.

They talk about that if you didn't create the problem
If you created the problem

10

or are responsible for the problem, i.e. a design person or

11

something like that, then in that circumstance no notice is

12

necessary because you created it or are responsible for it being

13

created.

14

If you read with me at the top of the next column they

15

explain —

16

page 5 it says, "We conclude, however, that the instant case

17

which was a" —

18

a defect of sorts, or at least that was the claim —

19

that the instant case does not fall within the no notice category

20

of cases that we articulated in Allen and Schoonerpase, because

21

here the defendant did not create the unsafe condition and is

22

responsible for it only in the context of maintenance, not for

23

its existence in the first place."

24
25

starting at the very bottom of the first column on

again a railroad crossing with this protuberance,

That's precisely what we have here.

"we conclude

The allegation is

going to be somehow by an expert, which I'll talk about in just a

-9moment, that perhaps there was a code violation.

The stair fell,

and there are some photos of this, your Honor, in the material.
There is a stringer that goes along the side of each side of the
stairway, and then the treads go —
by —

actually, they're supported

relying on a cutout on either side.

It's like a support on

either side of the tread or the stair itself into that stringer
that gives it support.
They maintain there are code violations.
be.

The point is, your Honor, my client —

That may well

and there are no

facts that establish this — had anything to do with creating the
problem.
So the Court tells us that when that's the case, if you
go back to the very bottom of that second column on page 5
starting —

it says, "If a plaintiff alleges that a defendant

negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that the
defendant did not create, negligently failed to repair a
dangerous malfunction in an otherwise safe system, or negligently
allowed an otherwise safe condition to degrade over time into a
dangerous condition, then the evidence of —

then evidence of

notice and reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a
motion for summary judgment."
Then again, "These requirements do not apply where the
negligent claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant actually created the dangerous condition or purposely
built the dangerous condition into the system for which the
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defendant is responsible.

2

rules is that a —

3

party has notice of condition that that party himself —

4

itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of a

5

condition that someone else creates."

6

The rational behind these distinct

is that it is reasonable to presume that a
or party

So I think it's very, very clear here under the facts

7

that since my guy did not buy —

did not create it, was not

8

responsible for creating it, came in nine months before and

9

purchased it, inspected it, had it inspected for him and then had

10

no notice of any problems whatsoever, even by the user -- daily

11

users of this step, that this case applies.

12

absolute notice established, and there is none.

13

There must be

Plaintiffs attempt to get around this by attempting to

14

establish constructive notice, and they do it rather curiously in

15

a way that I quite honestly don't understand.

16

their responsive memorandum they talk about some factors that

17

they believe —

18

notice under. •

19

If you'll look at

or that they attempt to establish constructive

For example -- and I'm reading from page 8 of their

20

brief.

It's here that they make the argument that this

21

constructive notice existed.

22

that it had been built in 1985.

23

primary —

24

true.

25

had been no structural changes made.

They say Herb Treanor, my guy, knew
Okay.

True.

That that was his

the egressing and to and from the apartment.

It had been there for 20 years.

That's true.
That's true.

That's

That there
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That Mr. Treanor failed to verify whether the tread

2

properly fit into the pocket into the stair stringer.

3

that's not true.

4

that in just a moment.

5

Well,

He did what was reasonable, and I'll discuss

They then rely upon an expert, Mr. Brunetti, to support

6

their contention that a reasonable inspection would have revealed

7

that the integrity of the stair was in question.

8

the factors they attempt to state create constructive notice do

9

not apply here.

Well, first,

You've got to understand, your Honor, these

10

stairs are stairs that are — they're not truly outside, they are

11

covered, but they are wrapped in a carpet:

12

a metal edge, and they go into a wall and you cannot see the

13

stair or the stringer that holds them in place.

14

Initially in his deposition —

On the edge they have

I took Mr. Brunetti's

15

deposition and I asked him, I said —

16

his deposition and we say what could he have done?

17

said he could have done nothing; there's nothing he could have

18

done to find this.

19

have this MIA adjustor go out and do an inspection?'' He said,

20

"Absolutely."

21

and we cite and quote from
In essence he

I said, "Well, is it reasonable for him to

The plaintiffs then come back with an affidavit that

22

attempts to support their contention that a reasonable inspection

23

would have revealed this problem.

24

attempt to rely partly on the fact that my client has some

25

construction experience, and they attempt to establish a

However, in doing so they
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different duty based upon his background.

2 I

What we did, your Honor, we went to the law and in our

3

responsive memorandum we cited to a case by the name of Mitchell

4

vs. Christensen.

5

There's a whole lot of law out there regarding buyers and sellers

6

when defects occur when somebody buys a house, as you might

7

imagine.

8

the proper standard for the discoverability of defects is of an

9

ordinary person.

10
11

This case arises in a little different context.

The law there is very clear that the duty to inspect is

In order words, they can't slide the scale

based upon my guy's background.
In fact, when Mr. Brunetti had to have done his

12

homework, I would argue, he had no idea that my client had any

13

construction experience.

14

done to discover this alleged defect.

15

back and —

16

found out that he was a contractor for a number of years that he

17

said, "Oh, yeah, he could have done something."

18

He said there was nothing he could have
It was only after he went

after I took his deposition and read some stuff,

Well, it would be like, in my mind, creating a different

19

standard of care for people who drive a vehicle.

They're all

20

held to the same standard of care whether they're 16 or 60, and

21

the Court sets the duty, not Mr. Brunetti.

22

established that duty.

23

fact at all pertaining to any of the inspection, and we believe

24

this is just what it was, it was an unknown condition that was

25

unknowable to anyone until this unfortunate accident happened.

The law has

So we believe that there is no issue of
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As a result under the law which we've cited, and we rely

2

heavily on our briefs, your Honor.

I don't mean to suggest

3

otherwise that my client is —

4

which would —

5

prevent (inaudible) and we'd ask the Court to do so.

that there are no issues of fact

genuine issues of fact which would in any way

6

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Plant.

7

MR. PLANT:

Thank you.

8

THE COURT:

Mr. Ivie, you may respond.

9 J

MR. IVIE:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I think

10

just perhaps an overview as you've definitely discerned the Goble

11

case which appears to be (inaudible).

12

the two classes of situations that I think if we go to the

13

obvious extremes where there's no grey areas we can see the

14

situation.

15

The Goble case discusses

If it's one of those cases, for instance, in a

16

supermarket where a grape falls on the floor, the owner of that

17

property cannot really be held accountable in strict liability

18

fashion to be able to correct that defect without some sort of

19

notice.

20

of the cases that have been cited deal with ice cream on the

21

floor or deal with cottage cheese on the floor.

22

that have gone up where the store owner or the property owner

23

requires notice.

24
25

The store owner has to be able to clean that up.

Some

Those are cases

On the other end of the spectrum are the cases where
it's quite clear that defective property conditions are the
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responsibility of the owner, and that their duty should be to

2

first of all, the original owner should design it properly, build

3

it properly, and we contend that it would also include subsequent

4

owners such as Mr. Plant's client in the present case.

5

believe that that is discussed in the distinction between the two

6

classes of cases that Justice Durham cites to in the Goble case.

7

—

We

Now what Durham indicates is that first of all, the

8

classes in the first instance where notice is required as well as

9

an opportunity to correct, he states, "It is quite universally

10

held that"

—

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. IVIE:

13

Refer me to your page, Mr. Ivie.
On my page which is Lexis, it's page 8.

I

believe (inaudible) we have, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. IVIE:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. IVIE:

Yeah.

Yeah.

Page 8 right hand column very bottom.
Okay.
Okay.

She states, "It is quite universally

18

held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that

19

liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met.

20

that he have knowledge of the condition, that is either actual

21

knowledge or constructive knowLedge."

22

knowledge is critical because it is plaintiff's position in the

23

case, first of all, that we think this is a no notice case; but

24

if it is a notice case, summary judgment would be inappropriate

25

because there's sufficient facts to establish constructive

A)

Now that constructive

-15knowledge.
The quote goes on to say, "Because the condition had
existed long enough that he should have discovered it, and that
after such knowledge sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise
of reasonable care he should have remedied it."
Now at that point Durham addresses the no notice class
of cases.

"The second class of cases, however, involve some

unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as in the structure
of the building or of a stairway, et cetera, or in equipment or
machinery or in the manner of use which was created or chosen by
the defendant or his agents, or for which he is responsible.

In

such circumstances where the defendant either created the
condition or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the
condition, and no further proof of notice is necessary."
So the two classes of cases, if we look to the extremes,
the stairway or some design defect is clearly considered in that
second class of cases.
Now we apply that to the facts in Goble with the
railroad crossing, and they indicate that in that case where if
you look to the facts that are cited in Goble, there were many
parties that had potential liability.
Pacific had settled out.

As a matter of fact, Union

The designer of the rubber mats that

created the condition had settled out.

UTA was a party to it.

There were all sorts of multiple parties, and it is explained
early on in the Goble decision that Southern's responsibility was
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to maintain the property.

2 I

They look to that in placing this in the grey area of

3

the notice being required portion that they only had a duty to

4

maintain it.

5

and we suggest that there is no reason for saying that stairways,

6

which are specifically enumerated by the Court as one of the

Now apply that to the facts of the current case,

o
7

second class or no notice cases, should fall within that fact

8

situation where many parties are responsible for this crossing,

9

and where Southern's responsibility was simply to maintain the

10

crossing.

11

maintain.

12

They didn't create it.

They simply had a duty to

We submit, then, that this is a no notice case, but if

13

the Court finds that it does fall within the class of cases that

14

require notice and an opportunity to repair, we would also submit

15

that sufficient facts are there to go to the jury.

16

As we have set forth -- and the original deposition of

17

our expert, Mr. Brunetti, we would like to become part of the

18

record*.

19

he probably didn't bring it here today.

20

transcript that I wonder if we could stipulate to have the Court

21
22

consider that as the original.
MR. PLANT: That's fine.

I believe the original is in Mr. Plant's possession but

23

MR. IVIE:

Okay.

24

(Counsel confer with one other)

25

THE COURT:

He has signed?

I have a condensed
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MR. IVIE:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. IVIE:

Yes.

May I approach?

Yes, you may.
Mr. Brunetti's report is contained in the

4

back of that as an exhibit, and it also was produced and should

5

be part of the Court's file as part of our supplemental

6

disclosures of expert opinions.

7

that this stairway was allowed to cause this terrible accident.

8 I
9

He indicates a number of ways

To let the Court know, because I'm not certain that it's
really clear in the memorandum how this is designed; Mr. Plant

10

explained it fairly well.

11

original motion indicate his client had built a number of

12

apartment complexes, and had always used steel stringers and

13

treads.

14

complexes or commercial buildings is steel stairways with steel

15

treads that are usually built of concrete.

16

The attachments to Mr. Plant's

That is what typically we see in Utah in apartment

In this case it was designed so that one-and-one-half

17

inch stringers had a pocket cut into them, and inside that pocket

18

the edges of the wood treads was set to fit.

19

driven into that and the photographs of the failed tread in this

20

case indicate that those nails had been exposed long enough to be

21

rusted.

22

Now nails were then

This is not a type of construction that the

23

plaintiff had ever used in his buildings, and it is according to

24

Mr. Brunetti in his report, a negligent type of design.

25

indicates on page 2 of his report that the way the stair treads

He
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are cut into the stair stringers is not consistent with adequate

2

bearing of the tread onto the stringer.

3

a third of the way down.

4

That's in the note about

He also indicates that the wood material used to build

5

the stairs is not of the size required by the 1985 code.

At the

6

beginning of his report he indicates that it is the duty of the

7

land owner to continue to maintain the property consistent with

8

the 1985 code.

9

in this case to continue to maintain it in that condition.

So that would become a duty of Mr. Plant's client
So

10

from the time that he took possession, they would have a duty to

11

bring it up to code.

12

He indicates that —

about a fourth of the way up from

13

the bottom on page 2 that the wood members used to build the

14

staircase measure one-and-one-half inches of S-4-S material.

15

goes on to indicate on page 3 towards the top that wood stairways

16

in multiple family dwellings have a higher need for best

17

management practices, and that wood has a tendency to shrink,

18

therefore competent building maintenance personnel need to be

19

aware of these high use areas containing wood supporting members.

20

Then he quotes, "As wood loses or gains moisture it will shrink

21

or swell.

22

in width and thickness and very little in length."

23

He

Because of its cell structure, wood shrinks primarily

Well, what we indicates in the next paragraph is that

24

the wood had actually shrunk, which is something that will happen

25

in a desert climate, and it had actually come loose at the pocket
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and was being held only by those rusty nails.

2

He goes on further to indicate that the wood itself had

3

cracked.

4

available for trial still with the carpet covering on it, and

5

that's the next thing is the carpet covering makes it hard to

6

detect the condition.

7

We have stair tread in our possession, and it will be

Now I think that will be critical, and I have located a

8

couple of new cases in preparing for oral argument today that

9

indicate what only is rational, and that is a user of that

10

stairway, whether it be his —

11

tenants in the apartment complex, or the plaintiff himself

12

certainly, have no ability to remove that carpet and check for

13

defects in the stairway.

14

building owner.

15

to make certain that when there is a stairway like the one in

16

this case, which is not designed the way that he put in stairways

17

into the buildings that he had, that he designed and built.

18

Also, as he indicated that he was concerned enough about them

19

that he would jump up and down on them when he was considering

20

the purchase of it because of this rather odd construction, that

21

there should be some heightened duty on behalf of the landlord.

22

the plaintiff's children, who were

The only one that can do that is the

Because of that the building owner has the duty

Now Mr. Plant indicates —

and I received a reply brief

23

on Friday, and he makes the argument again here today.

He says,

24

"Under Utah law with respect to the purchase of real property,

25

the proper standard for the discoverability of a defect is that
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of an ordinary prudent person."

2

made there, your Honor.

3

Well, a couple of points can be

First of all, the standard is not merely an mythical

4

ordinary and prudent person.

5

under the circumstances that face the defendant or anyone else

6

who's negligence is weighed by the jury.

7

It's an ordinary and prudent person

To that extent, the skill, experience, training of

8

Mr. Treanor, the owner of this property, is critical evidence.

9

Now this was specifically discussed in his deposition —

or

So to the extent

10

excuse me, in the deposition of Mr* Brunetti.

11

that Mr. Plant makes it seem that perhaps this is some surprise

12

that Mr. Treanor —

13

part in determining whether or not he noticed this defect,

14

whether he had constructive notice of it, and whether he remedied

15

the defect, Mr. Plant was aware that this was not an opinion that

16

he had reached that he's contradicting in a subsequent affidavit.

17
18
19

his client's experience may play an important

If I may, on page 77 of Mr. Brunetti's deposition, line
19 he's asked on 19:
Q.

There have been three additional

20

depositions taken m

21

apparently haven't seen.

22

He says:

23

A.

this case that you

Okay.

24

And we discuss who they were.

On page 78, line 4

25

the other deposition is Mr. Treanor's.

-21Q.

What would you be looking at in these

depositions?
A.

Well, I would be looking at Mr. Treanor's

background in terms of how many properties he owns.
I'm sure it's been asked and answered in the depos,
I would think.
Q.

BY MR. PLANT:

It was.

A.

Obviously all depositions —

Skipping down to 16 or 17.
A.

Secondly, I —

and that's important to

me because if he's a professional property owner,
I would expect his knowledge and understanding of
maintenance to be higher than the average person's.
Okay, that was one thing I would be looking for.
Then on page 79, line 2.
A.

I would be looking for his credibility as

a land owner.

Not just his financial credibility, but

his background, which I'm going backwards again to what
I was talking about earlier and what people he relies on
to render opinions on his behalf.

Who is an extension

of himself and what is the person's qualifications.
Those are the things I would be looking for.
So then on line 12:
Q.

Here's the way I'm going to leave this.

This is Mr. Plant.

-22Q.

1

I'm not going to do anything further today.

2

I'm going to term —

3 J

deposition, but continue the deposition subject

4

only to your providing us a supplemental report.

5

And he says:

6

A.

7

or to not terminate the

I understand.

Quite simply, your Honor, this isn't surprise and

8

it's not contradiction.

9

Mr. Plant specifically indicated to the witness that yes, he had

10

been questioned about his skill and experience, and basically as

11

the supplemental pages (inaudible) original motion indicate his

12

client has 40 years of experience in the construction business.

13

It wasn't a full time job, but for 40 years he's maintained a

14

license and built numerous single family homes, commercial

15

project, and I believe currently owns approximately five

16

apartment complexes.

17

It was specifically discussed there.

This all falls within reasonableness under his

18 • circumstances.

No, it's not a professional type of —

as it

19

would be in a malpractice action.

It's just a landowner in his

20

circumstances as —

21

be held to reasonableness with his degree of care as opposed to

22

mom and pop who own their home and perhaps have never owned a

23

house before, don't know what things should be checked on a

24

regular basis.

25

should apply in determining whether or not there was actual

obviously public policy would suggest should

Clearly we think those are facts that the jury

-231 I notice here, whether or not there was negligence.
2

Now finally, your Honor, I would indicate as I said

3

earlier that this weekend while I was working on jury

4

instructions and also preparing for this, I was finally able to

5

locate a couple of stairway cases from other jurisdictions that I

6

think are instructive.

7 J

One of those cases was just handed down within the last
few weeks out of New York, and is probably the closest on point
to the current case.

In that case the Court with facts that were

10 I nearly identical to those here did not apply strict liability as
11

Mr. Plant correctly points out that Justice Durham rejected in

12

the Goble decision, but did apply the theory of res ipsa loquitur

13

to a stairway case.

14

The case in question, and I can provide the Court with

15

either copies of the cases or a supplemental brief, but it's

16

Toraz vs. Hordice (phonetic) and this is a 2006 case.

17

of New York, 11 Miscellaneous 3rd 23, the Westlaw cite.

18

2006, Westlaw, 176941.

19

It's out
It's

In that case the plaintiff was a meter reader from

20

Consolidated Edison.

While she was descending a wooden staircase

21

leading to the basement of residential premises owned by the

22

defendant, it was her testimony that as presented in trial that a

23

recurring leak in the area had rotted the steps and handrail

24 J causing them to collapse on her.

25

Now in that case, the thing that was considered by the

-241 1 Appellate Court was the trial Court denied plaintiff's request
2

for a jury charge on res ipsa loquitur on the ground that the

3

doctrine is inapplicable where the plaintiff's witnesses gave a

4

complete explanation of what happened.

5

The Appellate Court in that case held that to invoke the

6

doctrine of res ipsa the plaintiff must establish three things,

7

and I think that these are the critical considerations here.

8

That the accident was not of a kind ordinarily occurring in the

9

absence of negligence.

Second, that the instrumentality or

10

agency causing the accident was within the defendant's exclusive

11

control.

12

action or contribution by the plaintiff.

13

Three, that the accident was not due to any voluntary

Direct quote from the Court.

"The first and third

14

elements of plaintiff's res ipsa claim were clearly established,

15

and indeed are not now challenged on appeal.

16

protective hand railings do not generally collapse and fall

17

apart" —

18

due to faulty installation, maintenance or repair.

19

of walking down stairs while holding on to the railing does not

20

make the accident plaintiff's fault or put the stairs and railing

21

under his control."

22

excuse me —

Stairs and

"apart in the absence of negligence, i.e.,
The mere act

The Court cites some cases in support of that.

The

23

Court then says, "With respect to the element of exclusive

24

control, trial testimony that the basement staircase was

25

infrequently used by a single tenant was of sufficient
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exclusivity to fairly rule out the chance that the defect was

2

caused by some agency other than defendant's negligence."

3

Well, in this case we've got the same aspects of the

4

first two elements as was present in this New York case. As to

5

the third, as Mr. Plant conceded, there's no real dispute as to

6

how this accident occurred.

7

tread giving way, and we would submit that that brings it within

8

the clear purview of res ipsa as considered by that Court.

9

It was very clearly this one stair

Now there are two other cases that I located in

10

following up on this, and the other one is an old 1932 New York

11

case, Caps vs. Goldring, which is 260 New York 2nd, 796, 1932.

12

This case in an old tenement building a plumber and his helper

13

replacing wash tubs with sinks, a new modern convenience.

14

They were on the landing of the stairway, and that gave

15

way.

16

have actual notice.

17

involved in this case are admittedly a tenement house and the

18

duty defaults upon the defendant who is the owner to keep the

19

stairway and its landings in good repair, and not to permit it to

20

be an unsafe and dangerous condition at any time prior to the

21

accident.

22

of the evidence in this case that the defendant had notice or

23

knowledge of the existence of the unsafe and dangerous condition.

24
25

The trial Court charged the jury that they would need to
Here's the jury instruction.

"The premises

The defendant is not liable unless you find from all

"In other words, gentlemen, the mere existence of an
negligent condition without notice of its existence either as a
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matter of personal knowledge or for the reason that it obtained

2

for such period of time that in the exercise of ordinary care the

3

landlord could or should have known of its existence does not

4

create a liability."

5 I

The Court refused the request of plaintiff's Counsel to

6

charge this —

to give this as an instruction.

"If the jury

7

finds and believes that this accident happened because the

8

landing on which the plaintiff was walking down fell with the

9

plaintiff on it, and that no act of negligence on his part

10

contributed to it, and that there is no satisfactory explanation

11

of the cause of the falling by the defendant, then in (inaudible)

12

plaintiff may recover."

13

So in that case the Appellate Court reversed holding

14

that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, that actual or

15

constructive notice need not be proved because the defect was

16

apparently structural in nature.

17

It takes us back to Goble.

The structural part of it

18

is what turns it into a no notice case.

19

distinction.

20

the structural link that says it's a no notice case.

21

here they applied res ipsa.

22

That's* the critical

It's not ice cream, cottage cheese or grapes.

It's

However,

One final case, and that's one out of Ohio that I

23

discovered, McConohead vs. Hortious (phonetic) and this was a

24

Westlaw cite from 2005.

25

in this Court.

So once again since this case was filed

It's 2005 Westlaw 121656.

Now in this case it's
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interesting because a father, as in this case, was descending a

2

staircase in his daughter's home which she was leasing, and it

3

ruptured beneath him causing him to fall into the staircase. So

4

almost the same facts here, only it's interior to the home.

5

Now the Court made a critical comment on the fact that

6

the stair was covered with carpet.

In that case the Court held

7

that where the daughter leased the present —

8

quote from the Court.

9

an inference of negligence upon proof.

well, let me just

"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur creates
Appellant had exclusive

10

control of the instrument causing injury and the accident was one

11

that would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence."

12

They then have some cites, and then it says, "Appellants

13

argue appellees did in fact have exclusive control over the

14

staircase; therefore, the res ipsa doctrine applies. We agree a

15

tenant's possession of the premises is not equivalent to control,

16

nor does possession in the case of a landlord's exclusive

17

management end control.

18

"Further, the alleged defects sub (inaudible) was

19

covered by carpeting on the stairs.

To inspect the alleged

20

defect would require removal of the carpeting by the tenant. We

21

find the authority to remove the carpet and make any necessary

22

repairs discovered rests with the landlord, and would require

23

approval of the landlord.

24

appellee/landlord maintained exclusive maintenance and control

25

over the alleged defect despite tenant's possession of the

Based upon the foregoing we find the
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premises."

2

Quite simply, your Honor, I think that it comes down to

3

this.

Summary judgment is not appropriate here because depending

4

how the evidence comes in at trial, it's going to be clearly a no

5

notice case —

6

falling within the grey area because of some of the language in

7

Goble and trying to fit this —

8

the no notice and notice cases.

9

evidence at trial it's going to have to come down to then on

well, it may not be so clearly.

I think we're

fit the Goble facts in between
I think depending on the

10

whether or not this is considered a no notice case or a notice

11

case.

12

constructive notice is present, and it is clearly an issue that

13

should be submitted to the jury if notice is required.

14

If it is a notice case we've cited the argument that

Finally, the recently discovered case law and res ipsa

15

loquitur would appear to be the soundest reasoning that a

16

commercial landlord such as this has this type of defect as close

17

to the mom and pop situation.

18

should be applied.

19

THE COURT:

20

I'll grant you a few minutes response (inaudible).

21

MR. PLANT:

22
23

All right.

That is the standard of care that

Thank you, Mr. Ivie.

And I'm (inaudible) because I have another

matter (inaudible) your Honor.
What Mr. Ivie, bless his heart, attempts to do in this

24

Court has not read the Goble case.

The Goble case is very

25

straightforward in that it addresses a situation such as here
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where the owner of the premises, the person responsible for it,

2

did not create the problem.

3

say, however —

4

does not fall within the no notice category of cases that we

5

articulated in Allen and Schoonerpase, because here the defendant

6

did not create the unsafe condition and is responsible for it

7

only in the context of maintenance, not for its existence in the

8

first place."

9

It couldn't be more clear when they

"We conclude, however, that the instant case

They go on to say and give this Court incredible

10

guidance.

Normally we don't get this, and this is a 2004

11

decision.

The Court should remember that.

12

pronouncement of our Courts, not the New York Supreme Court.

13

The most recent

They go on to say, "If a plaintiff alleges that a

14

defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that

15

that defendant did not create, they must come forth with notice."

16

That's on the bottom of page 5 and top of page 6.

17

So I invite the Court to read this case.

Mr. Ivie has

18

done what he should have done and tried to convince the Court

19

that it doesn't say what it says, but it does say what it says.

20

Under our facts the Allen case dealt with a defendant that

21

created the problem.

22

this problem, you should be charged with notice of it.

I have no problem if you're going to create

23 J guy owned this thing for eight months.

He did not —

24

said he had anything to do with creating the problem.

25

is —

it is a notice case.

Here my
nobody has
So that

To do otherwise, your Honor, would be
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to mandate and hold my client absolutely responsible for this

2

case —

3

or for this matter on a strict liability basis.
I want to read the Court some of what Brunetti, their

4

expert said, in the deposition that Mr. Ivie has published.

5

talks about some things on page 74 at the top, line 2.

6

Q.

He says:

Well, after it was built, tell me every

7

criticism you have of him in regards to him being

8

the purchaser, my client, irregardless of the code

9

or otherwise.

10

He

Stated another way, what should he

have picked up on these code violations.

11

A.

Mr. Treanor himself?

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

I don't know how he could have.

14

Well —

and then he goes on on the next page and he

15

talks about the fact that Mr. —

16

Mr. Treanor retained an MIA appraiser.

17

exactly what he should have done; that's fulfillment of his

18

obligation in that regard.

19

So my guy —

on the top of page 75 how
He testifies that that's

here's what Phil has to have this Court

20

believe.

There are thousands of stairs in this complex.

That we

21

were supposed to rip the carpet off of every one to do a quote,

22

"reasonable inspection," unquote to see if there's someone we

23

could see into the tread, into —

24

and see if it goes in there far enough.

25

asking us to do.

excuse me, into the stringer
That's what they're
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Yet he also said, "I don't know how he could have done

2

that."

3

notice, this constructive notice that they would want this Court

4

to believe that there's some sort of an issue about.

5

simply is no issue.

6

That's precisely what their own expert said.

That's the

There

This was a latent hidden defect that could not have been

7

discovered by anyone.

They attempt to say —

my —

Herb Treanor,

8

82-years-old, should know that, your Honor.

9

with the construction industry, but we (inaudible) Utah case

He did get involved

10

(inaudible).

11

duty of inspection.

12

pool.

13

construction guy.

14

has an obligation based upon his background, but rather it's the

15

ordinary prudent person.

16

to that obligation.

17

It's cited in my brief, and it talks about this
That case dealt with a leaking swimming

It talked about the fact that the defendant there was a
The Court specifically rejected that an owner

It's everybody is the same in regards

More importantly than that, what is it that my guy knew

18

that was going to give him greater insight?

Mr. Ivie said he

19

never built one of these staircases, never seen one built.

20

what does that give him?

21

industry, he looks at them, he jumps on them.

22

actual notice of any problems, and that's not been alleged here.

23

Let's not forget, there's nothing that's been alleged that even

24

gave him any notion to do anything more than walk on the stairs.

25

If it had wobbled, if it had creaked, if it had moved, I'll give

So

The fact that he's in the construction
No notice.

No
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you it's a different case.

2

moment that it failed.

3 1

So to make —

It did none of that up until the very

to come in and make my guy do something

4

different under these circumstances is just opposed to everything

5

I've quoted to the Court.

6 I

Now talk about res ipsa.

7

for two reasons.

8

control over this —

9

They were built by someone else.

Res ipsa doesn't apply here

Number one, my client didn't have exclusive
over these stairs.

They were out there.

Mr. Ivie made an interesting

10

point in Goble.

11

that built the railway crossing, the manufacturer of the rubber

12

mat.

13

Those folks settled out in Goble, the people

The designer, the buiLder, the prior owners are not even

14

named here, but that doesn't mean they are not the responsible

15

parties.

16

My guy's here just like Southern Railroad was there as the last

17

guy who has this place, but that doesn't give him any greater

18

responsibility.

19

They didn't settle out because they were never named.

I would ask and I would appreciate if the Court, if you

20

haven't done so, just take a minute before you rule to read

21

Goble.

22

comes squarely into this that you won't have to worry about a New

23

York case (inaudible) New York, that our Court has given us the

24

guidance that it wants our Courts to have, and under Goble we

25

win. We have to win because as the Court says, in order to

I am so confident that you will realize that this case
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1 I defeat a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff must show
2

evidence of notice under these circumstances.

3

They tell you that in this case.

4

didn't.

5

obligated to grant our motion, and we would ask you to do so.

6

Thank you.

7

They can't. We have —

That's rare. They

THE COURT: All right.

the Court, therefore, is

Gentlemen, thank you for your

8

presentation.

I'll take the motion under advisement and notify

9

you of my decision by minute entry ruling, assuming I'm able. I

10

realize we have a trial date that's been set in this matter, so

11

I'll (inaudible) get it out shortly.

12

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
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That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 17th day of July
2006.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2008
verly TL.owe
OTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County
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EXHIBIT 2
Trial Court's Minute Entry and Order Granting
Summary Judgment

I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTE^g g.
Third.
^
WESLEY A. MATHESON a n d
MATHESON,

LOIS
SALtUKEcc

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 050901427
vs,

Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
May 15, 2006

MARBEC INVESTMENTS, LLC, dba
ELMWOOD APARTMENTS, LLC.,
Defendants

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant Marbec Investments, d.b.a. Elmwood Apartments, LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motion on May 8, 2 006.

Following the hearing, the

matter was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
This personal injury case comes before the Court the result
of injuries sustained by Plaintiff Wesley Matheson due to a fall
occurring as he assisted his son in moving furniture down some
stairs at the Elmwood Apartments.
With this motion, Defendant argues the undisputed evidence
establishes that it did not breach any duty owed to Mr. Matheson
and was not negligent.

^strict

Specifically, Defendant asserts there is

0

ep%( <twT
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MINUTE ENTRY

no dispute that prior to the accident Defendant had no notice of
any problems with the stairway at issue.

Under Utah law,

contends Defendant, it must have notice of the problem and then
fail to remedy it within a reasonable time.
Lake City

S.R.R.

See Goebel

Co, 104 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004).

v.

Salt

Because

Plaintiffs cannot meet this standard, asserts Defendant, summary
judgment should be entered dismissing this matter.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing the condition of the
stairs on which Plaintiff Wesley Matheson was standing when the
stair failed was a permanent unsafe condition for which
Defendants were responsible.

Therefore, contend Plaintiffs,

under the applicable Utah law they were not required to have
notice of the condition and liability should attach.
In the alternative, assert Plaintiffs, if the condition of
the stairs was a temporary unsafe condition, Defendant had
constructive notice of the condition of the stairs as Herbert
Trayner (a licensed contractor and principal of Defendant who
inspected the Elmwood Apartments prior to their purchase in May
2000) should have known the stairs were unsafe given that they
were constructed of wood in 1985, exposed to the elements for 20
years, and that Mr. Trayner failed to verify that the stair tread
fit adequately into the pocket contained on the stair stringer
prior to his purchase of the Elmwood Apartments.

As such, argue

MATHESON v. MARBEC
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Plaintiffs, liability should attach to Defendants for their
failure to remedy the condition prior to Mr. Matheson's fall.
While at first blush, this appears to be a "permanent"
unsafe condition case, Goebel

makes clear that matters such as

this (where Defendant did not create the unsafe condition and is
responsible for it only in the context of maintenance, not for
its existence in the first place) are to be treated as
"temporary" unsafe conditions.

Indeed, similar to the Goebel

case, the proximate cause of Mr. Matheson's injuries is the
breakdown or degradation of something (the stairs) that was not
alleged to have been negligently created or installed.

This

said, the undisputed evidence clearly establishes that Defendant
had no notice of the problem with the stairs, actual or
constructive.

Consequently, summary judgment, as requested, is

appropriate and granted.
DATED this

/'/day of May, 2006.
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Attorneys for Defendant
Marbec Investment, LLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY A. MATHESON and LOIS
MATHESON,

v.

)
)
)
)
>

MARBEC INVESTMENTS, LLC, dba
ELMWOOD APARTMENTS, LLC.

]
]>

Plaintiffs,

1

Defendants

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
MARBEC INVESTMENTS, LLC, DBA
ELMWOOD APARTMENTS, LLC'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Civil No. 050901427
Judge: Frederick

]

The Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Marbec Investments, LLC, dba
Elmwood Apartments, LLC having come before the Court for oral argument on May, 8, 2006, R.
Phil Ivie having appeared for and on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and Terry M. Plant, having appeared
for and on behalf of the Defendant, and having considered the argument of counsel as well as
written briefs submitted by the parties hereto and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby
grants the motion of the Defendant and in doing so dismisses all claims of the Plaintiffs Wesley A.
Matheson and Lois Matheson against the Defendant Marbec Investments, LLC, dba Elmwood
Apartments, LLC with prejudice and on the merits.
The Court hereby adopts its reasoning as set forth in its Minute Entry dated May 15, 2006,
and signed on May 17, 2006, which is hereby incorporated by this reference.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, this
Jay of May, 2006 to the following:
R. Phil Ivie
M E & YOUNG
2260 West 2230 North, Suite 110
PO Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

EXHIBIT 3
Photographs of the Stairway and Collapsed Stair
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EXHIBIT 4
Dennis L. Brunnetti Curriculum Vitae, Expert Report
and Affidavit

JARED R. CASPER, #8160
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
226 West 2230 North, Suite 120
Provo,Utah 84603
801-375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY MATHESON AND LOIS,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BRUNETTI

MATHESON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARBEC INVESTMENTS, LLC,
dba ELMWOOD APARTMENTS, LLC

:
Civil No.: 050901427

Defendant.

Judge Frederick

I, Dennis Brunetti being the over the age of majority hereby deposes and states on
my oath as follows.
1.

I am over the age of 18, and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah

and familiar with the facts of the above-captioned matter.
2.

My services were engaged by the law firm of Ivie & Young to provide an

opinion regarding the condition and integrity of the stairs at the Elmwood Apartments.
3.

In formulating my opinion I reviewed photographs of the stairs in

question, completed a field inspection on December 15 and December 22, 2005, respectively,
and reviewed the depositions of Wesley Matheson, Shawn Matheson, Angie Matheson and
Herbert O. Trayner.
4.

That my qualifications for rendering an opinion in this matter are more

fully set forth in my curriculum vitae which has previously been provided to defense counsel.
5.

That I received training from the United States Army in Construction

Management in 1977 and 1978, that I attended the Salt Lake Community College for classes on
Building Codes and Field Applications and I am a certified ICBO Building Inspector and have
been a ICBO Building Inspector since 1979.
6.

That from 1975 through 1986 I held an active general contractors license.

7.

That I have over 25 years of construction and construction management

experience which includes 12 years of field experience in framing, finish carpentry, concrete flat
work, footing installation, roof shingling, site staking, site preparation, excavation, and finish
grading and 13 years of experience in construction management, field supervision, and inspecting
of field installations of sub-contractors.
8.

That I have been directly or indirectly responsible for the construction of

approximately 350 residential and light commercial properties.
9.

That in reviewing the information in the above captioned it is my opinion

that a thorough inspection of the stairs at the Elmwood Apartments would have put an inspector
with Herbert Trayner5 s experience on notice that there were gaps where the stair treads intersect
2

with the pockets on the stair stringers and that such an inspector would have noticed cracking of
an existing stair tread on the stairs leading from Apartment 16.
10.

That given my understanding of Mr. Herbert Trayner's experience as a

general contractor a reasonable inspection performed by him would have alerted him to the fact
that the wood stairs on which Wesley Matheson was injured, having been built some 20 years
prior to the accident and being wrapped with indoor outdoor carpeting and designed the way they
were designed, lacked sufficient integrity and the condition of the stairs posed an unsafe
condition for tenants and other persons visiting the Elmwood Apartments.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED AND SIGNED this J f e ^ d a v of April, 2002

DENNIS BRUNETTI
STATE OF UTAH
County of \M^—

)
ss:
)

On the r><9^day of April, 2006, personally appeared before me Dennis
Brunetti, the signer of the above Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that she executed the same.
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Cirriculum Vrtae for Dennis L. Brunetti information Consultants, LLC.

Education: 1965-1967; United States Army COE.AD; Construction Management
1977,1978; Community College of Salt Lake, Building Codes and Field
Applications; Certified ICBO Building Inspection since 1979.
1975 to 1977: Lundell Homes of Utah: Pleasant Grove. Utah
Responsible for all framing construction, and the supervision of framing craws.
Scheduled and supervised rough-in trades including electrical, HVAC, plumbing
and insulation. This work was then inspected by the local building inspector and
reviewed on site by myself. Worked regularly and closely with HUD/FHA/VA
architectural fee inspectors to insure that the building materials used and the
installations complied with the Uniform Building Code and the Minimum Property
Standards, (MPS).
1977 to 1979: Rindlesbach Construction Company. Salt Lake City. Utah
Responsible for all framing construction; made certain that building materials
meet UBC standards: Scheduled and supervised framing construction crews and
insured that their Meld applications complied with the requirements of the Uniform
Building Code. Scheduled rough framing inspections with the City, County and
FHA/VA Building Inspectors and met with these field inspectors to insure that the
structure complied with the building code requirements. Scheduled and
supervised the remainder of all building rough ins: Electrical, HVAC, and
plumbing; along with accompanying local building officials to insure compliance.
1979: Became certified as an ICC (International Code Council building inspector
by taking the required course work at Salt Lake Community College and passing
the required written examinations and being able to clearly articulate the
requirements of the building codes in a field type of application. Became a
licensed general building contractor by meeting the State of Utah requirements on
behalf of education and field experience. My license classification is Residential
and Light Commercial.
1979 to 1986: Kappa Construction Corporation
Was instrumental in forming Kappa Construction Corporation along with two
business partners. Responsible for all fieldwork: Development of the property,
which is now the Roxborough Subdivision. Responsible for permits and
excavation, framing, roof installation, and all rough ins: Electrical, plumbing,
HVAC, and inspections of these areas to insure compliance with the Uniform
Building Code, NEC (National Electrical Code), UBC (Uniform Building Code), and
the UMC (Uniform Mechanical Code). Responsible for having all on site personal,
including sub-contractors submit documentation for their liability insurance.

Page #2: A continuation of the Curriculum Vrtae for Dennis L Brunetti

1986 to present: Building Inspection Service. LLC & Information Consultants, LLC.
Independently began a consulting company called Building Inspection Service
designed to help lenders, realtors, homeowners, FHA/VA with construction
processesf building code inquiries, and field inspections for the primary and
secondary market. Dovetailed expert witness work into this business and have
represented such law firms as; Robert J. DeBry & Associates, Williams & Hunt,
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Fabian & Clendenin, Dewsnup, King & Olsen,
Smith & Glauser, Gridley, Ward, and Shaw, and Randal L Meeks, P. C. In addition
to expert witness work regarding building codes specific to slip and fall/trip and
fall cases, my forensic history also includes providing depositions, and court
testimony.
Information Consultants, LLC, Bio
Started Information Consultants as an independent research company specific to
the legal and medical professions, providing verbal and literature support for
clients needing information. Currently providing legal research for Robert J.
DeBry & Associates, and Renegade Oil Corporation.
25 plus years of construction and construction management experience: 12 years
of field experience in framing, finish carpentry, concrete flatwork, footing
installation, roof shingling, site staking, site preparation, excavation and finish
grading. 13 years of experience in construction management, field supervision,
and inspecting the field installations of subcontractors. Responsible directly or
indirectly for the construction of approximately 350 residential and light
commercial properties.

Slope of Grain
When the grain direction in a wood member is parallel to the
two edges of the piece the wood is said to have straight grain.
However, if the grain direction in a piece is not precisely
parallel to the board edges, strength will be lower than if edges
and fiber direction are parallel.
This 2x10 split along the grain direction revealing a slope of
grain of about 1 in 20.

An indication of the degree to which slope of grain affects
strength is provided by the table to theright.Even a slope of
grain of 1 in 20 results in a 7 percent loss of strength. A slope
of grain of 1 in 1 (a 45° angle) results in a 91 percent loss of
strength as compared to straight grain!

A slope of grain of almost 1 in 3 contributed to failure of the
side rail of this ladder, and in severe injury to the person who
was using it when it failed.

(Photo: John Haygrcen)
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Dennis Brunetti
Information Consultants, LLC.
3521 Suniland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-3234
801-272-8999 Office
801-272-1829 FAX
801-589-8894 Mobile
dbrunett@comcast.net

November 30, 2005

Forensic Work Completed beginning November 1993 to present
January 6, 1993: Render expert opinion on behalf of Joe Sattiewhite
June 4,1993: Render expert opinion on behalf of Kay Sannella
September 10, 1993: Render expert opinion on behalf of Kenneth Frett
October 5,1993: Steve Young v. Big D Construction
November 13, 1993: Carol O'Very v. Mountain American Credit Union
November 14s 1993: Vera Soles v. Three Link towers
November 15, 1993: Olyve Christianson v. Shadow Ridge Apartments
December 15,1993: Brad Bolton v. Shilo Inn, Elko, Nevada

January 5,1994: Bertha Martin v. Amoco Oil Company
March 7,1994: Render expert opinion on behalf of Irene Woodside
March 17,1994: Field Investigation @ 415 South Medical Drive, Bountiful Utah on
behalf of Alean S. Foster.
May 4, 1994: Johnson v. Miles, et al,
June 14, 1994: Render expert opinion on behalf of Rashell Quast
July 8, 1994: Render expert opinion on behalf of Deborah Nichols
August 2, 1994: Render expert opinion on behalf of Darrell Higbee

September 4, 1995: Render expert opinion on behalf of Sandra Burn

January 3; 2000: Render expert opinion on behalf of Jason Moore
January 20,2000; Render expert opinion on behalf of Nancy Krueger
May 17,2000: Gonzalo Garcia v. BK Enterprises
July 31,2000: Barcia v. Brian and Trelva Schick, DBA Casa Dea Apartments
July 31, 2000; Render expert opinion on behalf of Andra Dunkley
August 2, 2000: Render expert opinion on behalf of William Thompson
August 18, 2000; Toni Marie Foster v. Landmark Hotel, Park City, Utah
September 25, 2000: Leslie Epperson v. Coachman's Dinner & Pancake House

Paffe #2: Forensic work completed by Dennis Brunetti. Information Consultants,
LLC
January 13, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Donna sommer
January 29, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Ariane Borg
February 13, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Connie Kirkpatrick
March 16, 2001: Jacqui Harris v. Park City Corp. & The Morning Ray Restaurant
March 25, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of La Voye Baker
May 9, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Mark Lopez
May 11, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Barbara Fullmer
June 18, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Colby Holmes
August 27, 2001: Render expert opinion on behalf of Randall Davis
September 4, 2001: Rebecca Bradley v. Summer Garden Apartments
September 21, 2001; Davis v. Kim Davis Construction, et al

February 4,2002: Render expert opinion for Kevin and Stacey Easter
February 12, 2002: Render expert opinion for Jesse Moorhouse
February 27,2002: Render expert opinion for Peter Waite
March 11, 2002: Render expert opinion for Franklin Woodward
April 15, 2002: Merrill Cook v. Albertson's Food Stores for Dwight Epperson, Esq.
June 18,2002: Provide literature research and render expert opinion on behalf of Brett
Weaver for Roberrt J. DeBry & Associates.
June 21, 2002: Provide literature research and render expert opinion on behalf of Maxine
McKinley, for Robert J. DeBry & Associates.
June 21, 2002: Provide literature research and render expert opinion on behalf of Bo
Christensen.
August 7, 2002: Render expert opinion on behalf of Paul Porter
August 14, 2002: Render expert opinion on behalf of Steve Nielsen
August 30, 2002: Provide literature research and render expert opinion on behalf of
Robert German
October 7,2002: Render expert opinion on behalf of Brandi Morgan
October 14, 2002: Nicole Beeman v. Club Axis
November 5, 2002: Provide literature research and render expert opinion on behalf of
Kevin Clark
November 14, 2002: Evans v. Speck Construction, & Todd Lloyd Construction;
Dewsnup, King and Olsen, for the plaintiff.
December 9,2003: Sonny Stewart v. Regnarg: for Charles Gruber of Larsen & Gruber:
(Case is on hold as of this date).
January 20,2003: Kathleen Ebeling v, Lincoln Center Assn., AKA Lincoln Community
center.
January 22, 2003: Pamela Gentry v. Timber Wolf Condominium Lodges, Park City, UT.
February 13,2003: Render expert opinion on behalf of Brody Douglass: Gridley, Ward &
Shaw, Ogden, Utah.
February 18, 2003: Render expert opinion on behalf of Zeldine Graham: DeBry
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Page #3: Forensic work completed by Dennis Brunetti, Information Consultants,
LLC,
February 18, 2003: Render expert opinion on behalf of Ken Lip sey: DeBry
March 3, 2003: Provide literature research on behalf of Ten Nave; Eisenberg & Gilchrist,
March 14, 2003: Carol Murray for Ryan J. Bushell, Esq. Ogden, Utah
March 28, 2003: Afton Clontz, v. R_C. Willey, for Gridley, Ward & Shaw, Ogden, Ut.
April 1, 2003: Angel Villegas for field inspection, literature research and render expert
witness report: Steve Sullivan, Robert J. DeBry & Associates.
April 10, 2003; Brandon Kunz; field inspection, photos, etc. for Robert J. DeBry; G.
Steven Sullivan, Esq.
April 11, 2003: Tay-Jon Chamberlain for field inspection, literature research and render
an expert witness opinion: Steve Sullivan, Robert J, DeBry & Associates.
June 2, 2003: Follow up investigation on behalf of Angel Gallegos at the request of
Robert J. DeBry; G.Steven Sullivan, Esq,
January 23,2004: Allison Driggs, plaintiff injured on construction site.
Robert J, DeBry & Associated, Warren Driggs, Esq.
February 5,2004: David Hopkins. Provide literature research for plaintiff Hopkins.
Robert J, DeBry & Associates.
March 1, 2004: Mason Schick plaintiff; Robert J. DeBry & Associates, Wanren Driggs,
Esq. for the plaintiff.
March 19, 2004: Muriel Penant, plaintiff construction site accident; Robert J. DeBry &
Associates.
March 22,2004: Kelly Ludington, plainfiff, slip and fall; Robert J. DeBry & Associates,
May 26, 2004: Jeff Spaulding, plaintiff: trip and fall for Robert J. DeBry & Associates,
Brad Harr, esq. for the plaintiff.
June 8, 2004: Tim Loncasty, plaintiff, slip and fall for Robert J. Debry & Associates,
August 23, 2004: Cliff May v Peppermill Casino in Wendover, NV. for Driggs, Bills, &
Day, PC.
October 13,2004: Herdi Thamert, plaintiff; slip and fall for Robert J. DeBry &
Associates
October 28,2004: Kammerth V Reid; Smith & Glauser; Albert Gray, Esq. for the
defendant.
November 10, 2004: Nelson v Jennings; Don Russo, Esq. Gridley, Ward & Shaw and
Eisenberg & Gilchrist: Carbon monoxide poisoning.
December 21, 2004: Follow up to Kevin Clark v Kane County School District; Respond
to Interrogatories.
March 16, 2005: Tracey Hanson, plaintiff; handicapped ramp accident: Robert J. DeBry
and Associates.
March 17, 2005: Calder, et al v Big D Construction; carbon monoxide poisoning for
Robert J. DeBry & Associates, Geri Kelly, Esq.

Page #4: Fft^nsic work completed by Dennis Brunetti Information Consultants
LLC,

April 15, 2005: Follow up Nelson v Jennings: review depositions: inspect jobsite and
inspect furnace on behalf of carbon monoxide poising
May 4,2005: Deposition on behalf of Terry Nave v Hires Enterprises: Eisenberg &
Gilchrist. Deposed by Barbara Maw7 Esq.
May 109, 2005:
May 11, 2005: Follow up meeting with attorneys on behalf of Nelson v Jennings at the
Law Office of Gridley, Ward & Shaw, Layton, Utah,
June 15, 2005: Personal injury accident at the Wells Fargo Bank in Brigham City, Utah.
Visited jobsite and provided a legal investigation on behalf of building code violations
inside and outside the premise. Represented the Law Firm of Gridley, Ward & Shaw for
the plaintifFKathryn Sjoberg.
June 30th. 2005: OSHA violations during construction of a motel in St. George, Utah.
Plaintiff fell down steel panned stairs that were not in compliance with the IB C and
OSHA requirements: Robert I DeBry & Associates on behalf of Derek Andreason,
plaintiff.
August 4, 2005: Trip & Fall/Slip & Fall investigation for Robert J. DeBry FBO of Derek
Andreason. Location: Commercial construction site in St. George, UT.
September 6, 2005: Trip & Fall investigation for Robert I DeBry FBO Lydia Hansen at
the Hale Center Theater,
October 5,2005: Trip & Fall investigation for Robert J. DeBry FBO Shari Larsen,
American First Credit Union, Provo, Utah.
November 11, 2005: Slip & Fall, Trip & Fall for Robert J. DeBry, FBO Bernice Abeyta
at a residence in Rose Park, UT.
November 18, 2005: Trip & Fall for Robert J. DeBry FBO Sheryl Bramble at the Amber
Restaurant in SLC, UT.
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Dennis Brunetti
Information Consultants, LLC.
3521 Suniland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-3234
801-272-8999 Office
801-272-1829 FAX
801-580-8894 Mobile
dbrunett@comcast net

December 31, 2005

Mr. Jared R. Casper, Esq.
C/O Ivie & Young & Associates
2260 West 2230 North, Ste. 110
Provo, Utah 84603
RE: Wesley A. Matheson and Lois Matheson, v. Marbec Investments, LLC. dba
Elmwood Apartments, LLC.
Dear Mr. Casper,
In accordance with your request for my services and subsequent to my meeting with Mr.
Ivie at the law office of Ivie & Young I am submitting the following expert witness
opinion on behalf of the above referenced cliental
My understanding of this case and this opinion rendered is derived from photos given to
me by your office, our phone conversation on Friday December 9, 2005, a meeting with
Mr. Phil Ivie, Esq. on Wednesday December 14, 2005 and my field inspection completed
on December 15th & December 22nd. 2005 at the site in question described as the;
Elmwood Apartments, 4320 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107, Unit #16.
The following primary authorities I have used to create this opinion are: The Uniform
Building Code, 1985 edition and The International Building Code, 2003 edition.
Secondary authorities used to craft this opinion are the Western Wood Products
Association and the Forest Products Association.
The Uniform Building Code, 1985 edition and the International Building Code 2003
edition regulates maintenance of properties as follows:
Applications to Existing Buildings and Structures; Section # 104(d): All buildings
and structures, both existing and new, and all parts thereof, shall be maintained
in a safe and sanitary condition. All devices or safeguards which are required by
this code shall be maintained in conformance with the code edition under which
installed. The owner or his designated agent shall be responsible for the
maintenance of buildings and structures. To determine compliance with this
subsection, the building official may cause any structure to be reinspected.

This maintenance section establishes the owner's responsibility to keep the
building/buildings and its appurtenances maintained. This section also requires property
owners to be vigilant by performing regular premise checks on behalf of safety,
especially in areas where tenants, service people, and others walk to and from the
property.
Chapter 25 of the Uniform Building Code, 1985 edition is specific to wood and Section
2504(c), 4 Duration of load states:
Values for wood and mechanicalfastenings are subject to the following
adjustments for the various durations of loading (i); where a member (stair tread)
isfully stressed to the maximum allowable stress, either continuously or
cumulatively, for more than 10 years under the condition of maximum design
load, the values shall not exceed 90 percent of those in the tables1.
(Note: This section is needed so thatfloor joists (stair treads) have adequate
bearing surface on their supports. The way these stair treads are cut into the stair
stringers is not consistent with adequate bearing of the tread onto the stringer).
Chapter 25 also provides conventional construction provisions in Section 2517(d) (2),
Bearing as follows:
Except where supported on a I inch by 4 inch ribbon strip and nailed to the
adjoining stud (stair stringer), the ends of each joist (stair tread) shall have not
less than 1 V* inches of bearing on wood or metal, nor less than 3 inches on
masonry.
Additionally the Uniform Building Code, 1985 edition in Section 3306(n) regulates
exterior stairway construction as follows:
Exterior stairways shall be ofnoncombustible material except that on Types III
and IV buildings not exceeding two stories in height, and on Type V buildings,
they may be of wood not less than 2 inches in nominal thickness. (Note: The
Elmwood Apartments are a Type V building. The wood members used to build
this stair cases measure 1 */2 inches S4S material),
The UBC defines Exit facilities as:
Corridors serving an occupant load of 10 or more persons, exterior exit
balconies, stairways,fireescapes and similar uses. Individual stair treads shall
be designed to support a 300-pound concentrated load

Table NO. 25-G: Safe lateral strength and required penetration of box and common nails driven perpendicular to the
grain of wood. In this application the safe lateral strength for a 16d box nail is 82 lbs. for each nail and for a 16d
common nail the safe lateral strength is 108 lbs. for each nail. The safe lateral strength may be increased 25 percent
where metal side plates are used.

Mr. Casper, it seems that there are several factors that caused this fall for your client the
first being the lack of vigilance on behalf of whomever had control of the property and
more specifically maintenance in the areas of highest use such as stairways. Wood
stairways in multiple family dwellings have a higher need for best management practices
in that wood has a tendency to shrink therefore competent building maintenance
personnel need to be aware of these high use areas containing wood supporting members.
As wood loses or gains moisture, it will shrink or swell. Because of its cell
structure, wood shrinks primarily in width and thickness and very little in length
Secondly during my field inspection at the site known as the Elmwood Apartments I
noticed that some of the stair treads are not bearing inside the pocket cut into the stair
stringer by the builder or the framing contractor. This lack of positive bearing will cause
a stair tread to rotate when exposed to a live load; the weight of occupants walking on
them, etc. Since the property was built in 1985 some wood stair treads have shrunk thus
causing minimal or no bearing inside and onto some of the stair stringers. Thus the only
lateral supports are the nails, which have rusted over time in accordance with the photos
Fve reviewed along with the cracked stair tread your office has allowed me to review.
(Note: See the photo enclosed showing that when the grain direction in a wood member
is parallel to the two edges of the piece the wood is said to have straight grain.3
My belief is the stair tread in question had split parallel to the grain during or before the
moving process, hence the cracking noise heard before Mr. Matheson's fall as noted in
Lois and Wesley Matheson's depositions. Because of this lack of bearing and because of
the lack of any supplemental support such as a wood ribbon placed under the tread or
metal seismic plates nailed under the stair treads the stair tread/treads in question failed.
A thorough inspection of all of the stairs at the Elmwood Apartments by whomever has
or had control of the property would have noticed the gaps where the stair treads intersect
the pockets on the stair stringers, and they would have noticed cracking of an existing
stair tread coming from Unit #16 clearly visible when I made my field inspection of the
stairs in their current condition.
Finally chapter # 23 of the Uniform Building Code 1985 edition regulates the design
construction of exit facilities as follows:
Exitfacilities are required to be designed to support a uniform load of
lOOlbs. per square foot in accordance with Table # 23-A Uniform and
Concentrated Loads, as described in footnotes 4 &5 of this table as
follows: Footnote #4 states: Exitfacilities shall include such uses as

2
3

Western Wood Products Association; Douglas Fir & Western Larch species facts, published January 1996.
Forest Products Publication; factors which affect the strength of lumber

corridors serving an occupant load of 10 or more persons, exterior exit
balconies, stairways,fireescapes and similar uses.4 Footnote #5 states:
Interior stair treads shall be designed to support a 300 lb. concentrated
load placed in a position which would cause maximum stress.5
It seems that since your clients fall metal seismic anchors have been applied under all of
the stair treads at the Elmwood Apartments and connected using grabber screws. My
understanding is that this was accomplished after your client's accident. The application
has strengthened the stairs and the gaps where the treads meet the stringers have been
tightened and the bearing increased, however some treads in the complex still have no
bearing inside the pocket and the bearing on all treads remains minimal at no more than
Vi inch. Also, my concern about the property now is that I've noticed another cracked
stair tread; and cracked in a similar way as the stair tread that caused Mr. Matheson's fall.
My advice is to contact the management company or whoever has control of this property
to remedy this situation before another incident similar to this occurs.
Please call me if you have any further questions regarding this matter as I look forward to
talking with you again soon.

With best regards,
Dennis Brunetti
International Code Council
Building Inspector
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Uniform Building Code, 1985 ed. Table No. 23-A page #161.
Uniform Building Code, 1985 ed. Table No. 23-A page #161.

